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ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, the U.S. aircraft industry has experienced increasing levels of
international integration as companies seek to access global talent and resources, cut
production costs, spread financial risk, and secure access to airplane markets throughout
the world. In an increasingly complex environment, decision makers seek an effective
framework to evaluate the true benefits, costs and risks of sourcing alternatives-both
relating to the short-term effects of selecting particular suppliers or groups of suppliers,
as well as the long-term effects of redrawing their firm boundary and developing a more
vertically disintegrated supply chain.
This thesis is an examination of strategic sourcing decision practices at Boeing
Commercial Airplanes, based on a six-month internship study with the Future Airplane
Production group in Seattle, Washington. In this thesis we will discuss the application of
strategic analysis, lean operational analysis, managerial accounting, and Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to improve existing sourcing analysis practices. An
integrated decision support model is introduced to represent key sourcing decision
factors, their relative importance, and the expected benefits, costs and risks to
stakeholders related to each factor (comparing two sourcing alternatives). Using a
weighted average, the model expressly indicates the relative value of each alternative.
The model is applied to two case studies involving local insourcing and offshore
outsourcing, respectively. This study demonstrates the need for incorporating explicit
valuation of 'softer' strategic, operational and risk components along with the 'hard'
financial analysis when making sourcing decisions.
Thesis Supervisor: Stephen C. Graves
Title: Abraham J. Siegel Professor of Management Science, MIT Sloan School of
Management
Thesis Supervisor: Stanley B. Gershwin
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In this era of globalization, one of the major challenges facing companies is to
determine how to source for their various products and markets. Global sourcing',
combined with outsourcing, has become a principal strategic consideration for many
companies as they strive to leverage supply chain activities as a source of competitive
advantage. Still, opinions across many industries are that outsourcing decisions rarely
fully examine the expected benefits, costs, and risks of outsourcing and are seldom based
on a sound trade-off of risks and benefits (Clemens and Hitt, 1997).
1.1. Project Description
As part of a six-month internship study with Boeing's Future Airplane Production
group, this work seeks to explore how benefits, costs and risks should be addressed by
Boeing Commercial Airplanes 2 (BCA) to inform and motivate global sourcing decisions
in the commercial airplane industry. The principal goals of this thesis are four-fold. One,
it will examine in detail sourcing practices and trends within BCA, as well as the
aerospace industry in general. Two, it will seek to contextualize the current discussion
through a literature review of previous approaches toward internal work allocation (i.e.
work transfer), vertical integration (often referred to as make vs. buy), and external
supplier selection and management (i.e. procurement). Three, it will seek to enhance
awareness of the key issues and propose a strategy for approaching important sourcing
decisions via an integrated decision support model. Finally, it will illustrate the
application of the integrated decision support model using two sourcing case examples.
1.2. Approach and Methodology
In approaching this problem, I focused on acquiring a deeper understanding of the
global sourcing challenges facing Boeing Commercial Airplanes to develop insight
regarding what factors are relevant and necessary for consideration. At the outset, I
conducted informal interviews with Future Airplane Production group members who
The term global sourcing is commonly defined as: strategic sourcing in a global setting aimed "to exploit
global efficiencies in the delivery of a product or service." (Wikipedia, 2008).
This project dealt exclusively with the Commercial Airplanes division of The Boeing Company.
Henceforth, unless otherwise noted, all references to "Boeing" refers specifically to Commercial Airplanes.
were interested in helping Boeing make more informed sourcing decisions. After
establishing a general understanding of the issues and potential opportunities for
improvement, I applied the Six Sigma process design methodology-Define, Measure,
Analyze, Design, and Verify (DMADV)-to develop an integrated decision support
model for global sourcing.
In order to develop an understanding of the current state, I used three main
sources for field research: interviews, strategic sourcing meetings, and historical
documentation.
Interviews. When conducting face-to-face interviews, I used a semi-structured
methodology with a pre-designed questionnaire as a guideline (Appendix A: Interview
Questionnaire). Structured topics for discussion included: general perceptions of
company sourcing practices, insourcing, outsourcing, and offshoring; how Boeing
estimates make/buy opportunity costs; how the company measures and controls internal
and external sourcing costs, as well as risk and uncertainty during cost estimation;
whether the company has had any disappointments or shocks related to suppliers; what
costs have been overestimated or underestimated; and any other requirements or
recommendations for a strategic sourcing model.3
Sourcing Meetings. Monthly meetings of the company's strategic sourcing process
committee offered me direct insight into the inner workings of Boeing's process in
action. Facilitated by the Global Strategy group, the committee was created for the
purpose of aligning the supply chain with overarching company strategy. These meetings
provided a valuable perspective on who is actually involved in strategic sourcing, as well
as how the company procedures are implemented.
Historical Documentation. Company databases and files provided me with documentary
evidence of historical sourcing decision processes. My purpose in reviewing historical
files was to demonstrate what process record and information the company typically
3 Note: Interviews often departed from this guideline in order to explore anecdotal insight related to
sourcing practices and principles (both good and bad examples). Such perspectives and lessons were later
considered during the design of the model and incorporated, as appropriate.
creates and maintains when considering strategic sourcing, as it relates to organizational
learning and process improvement. The review was not an audit of the quality of past
sourcing decisions, nor does the absence of key decision factors in documentary evidence
imply that these factors were not considered in some way at the time the decisions were
made.
Throughout the study, I met with academic authorities in the fields of business
strategy, operations research, and finance, as well as Boeing employees at various levels
of responsibility and from various business groups to incorporate their feedback and
verify the model's validity and usability. Using the model as a framework, I will propose
a holistic and standardized approach for global sourcing decision analysis, and offer a set
of recommended structural process changes likely to improve the quality of Boeing's
global sourcing decision process.
The initial Define phase of the project involved extensive field interviews with
employees currently involved with or experienced in the company's sourcing process.
These interviews offered insight into how strategic sourcing decisions are generally
resolved within BCA, and provided the basis for a current state process map. I defined
the "customer" for the model as: a) senior leaders such as the Vice President of Airplane
Production ultimately responsible for all strategic sourcing decisions, and b) process
stakeholders such as Global Partners, Finance, Fabrication, and other organizations
directly responsible for data gathering and analysis support related to strategic sourcing
(Appendix B: Stakeholder Map).4 Through interviews with senior company leadership
and process stakeholders, I translated customer needs and expectations into critical-to-
quality metrics (Appendix C: Affinity Diagram).
During the Measure phase, I examined company sourcing analysis procedures
defined by internally published policies and procedures. Furthermore, I explored
historical sourcing documentation from a range of sourcing categories, including:
company internal work reallocation, insource-to-outsource work transfers, and military
and commercial offset work packages. Based on this documentation, I explicitly
4 Stakeholders defined in this work are limited to those directly tied to the strategic sourcing process and
outcomes, although indirect benefits from improved sourcing strategy can also extend much further to
shareholders, company employees, local communities, and suppliers.
identified the baseline factors BCA typically documented as part of past sourcing
decisions.
In the Analyze phase, I examined the company's current gated process for global
sourcing decision-making, both in design and in practice, to identify opportunities for
process improvement. I attended sourcing strategy and decision analysis meetings,
analyzed historical documentation from past sourcing decisions in greater depth, and met
with stakeholders to establish key leverage points which might offer the most valuable
opportunities for process improvement.
As part of the Design phase, I developed an integrated cost and risk framework
for global sourcing, based on input from both literature5 and practitioners6. The
conclusion to develop this type of decision support model is based in part on the
published practices of leading global firms in other industries. This evidence indicates
standardized multi-variable decision analysis can be a useful tool in facilitating effective
communication and decision-making.7 Focusing on the completeness and relevance of
the input factors, I chose to apply a straightforward methodology for factor estimation
and integration. This involved a simple weighted average method which I used to
incorporate the various qualitative and quantitative factor inputs within the proposed
framework and derive the model output.
Finally, during the Verify phase, I tested the proposed model's validity and
usability using two example case studies-sourcing of vertical fins for the Boeing 737
(offshore outsourcing) and Boeing 777 (local insourcing). As a measure of effectiveness,
the model's execution and output should support the overall project objective of helping
BCA make more informed global sourcing decisions through: a) helping identify the key
factors relevant to strategic sourcing decisions, b) unambiguously communicating and
documenting the importance of each factor (through factor weightings and an expected
5 The model and proposed methodology incorporate many foundational concepts based on the rich body of
academic knowledge, such as: 3-D Concurrent Engineering (Fine), Transaction Cost Economics (Coase
and Williamson), Property Rights Theory (Grossman and Hart), and Systems Dynamics (Sterman).
6 Employees from across Boeing Commercial Airplanes-in groups such as Global Strategy, Global
Partners, Future Production System, Final Assembly, Fabrication, Lean, Finance, Marketing, and others-
were instrumental in developing and refining the model's list of relevant input factors.
7 An example of multi-objective decision analysis for sourcing, as applied by IBM, is outlined by
Kirkwood, Slaven and Maltz (2005) in their article "Improving Supply-Chain-Reconfiguration Decisions at
IBM."
outcome), and c) identifying the most significant anticipated risks. These three
characteristics directly support global sourcing decision-making, and also promote
process improvement and organizational learning.
Thanks to continued support from the Future Airplane Production team, a follow-
on six-month project will continue this study and analyze in greater depth a few key areas
to effectively achieve and maintain the desired improvement: a) how to best gather input
data through establishment of linkages to quantitative data sources and elicitation of
qualitative data from cross-functional teams; b) refinement of the factor integration
method to more effectively incorporate qualitative and quantitative factors; and c)
implementation and integration of the future state process design with ongoing sourcing
practices.
1.3. Limitations
A practical barrier for implementing the framework immediately is shortage of
information. While strategic and risk analysis is generally qualitative in nature (relating
to data where feasible), operational and financial analysis is expressly quantitative in
nature. Unfortunately, the current use of traditional financial accounting, control and
measurement systems throughout BCA--which "burdens" the cost of direct labor with an
aggregated overhead pool 'tax' rate--does not align with value stream based decision-
making, as I will discuss later in further detail.
It is also important to note that access to information for this study was strictly
limited to what company employees were willing to share to an external 'consultant.'
Thus, whatever documentation and insight I obtained may be incomplete and provide
only a partial picture of what decision makers discussed and considered but perhaps did
not document as part of past global sourcing decisions.
Finally, the six-month project timeframe served to constrain this work. As the first
phase of a multiple-internship study, I chose to sacrifice some depth of analysis and
refinement of model sub-elements in order to achieve the necessary breadth of scope. I
felt it was important to do so to establish an overarching framework that effectively
addresses the multi-faceted and complicated issue of helping Boeing Commercial
Airplanes improve its strategic sourcing process.
1.4. Project Goals and Measurement
This work is part of an ongoing research study sponsored by Boeing Commercial
Airplanes intended to model, analyze, and improve the quality of the company's global
sourcing decisions. The desired end state for this project is to contribute to the body of
global sourcing knowledge in the commercial aerospace industry, and to formulate
substantive process improvements for Boeing Commercial Airplanes.
The project's success will be measured by the extent to which company leaders
and strategic sourcing process stakeholders are satisfied with the proposed model and
process redesign and its ability to improve the performance of the system. In this work,
the quality of a strategic sourcing decision is determined based on:
* Effectiveness. Performance of the system (e.g. alignment with overarching strategy,
satisfaction of stakeholders, etc.).
* Efficiency. Within-process step performance (e.g. minimizing non-value added
activities, total lead time, etc.)
Ideally, our goal is to make effective sourcing choices efficiently. However, in
practice, excessive emphasis on accuracy can add work to the degree that the new process
becomes slow and unresponsive to the company's needs. Similarly, efficiency without
effectiveness is likely to result in an organization running fast in the wrong direction.8 If
forced to make a choice between efficiency and effectiveness, therefore, we must choose
effectiveness.
Of particular note, as components of effectiveness which may be currently
lacking, long-term focus and scalability were most commonly cited as important to
incorporate into the design of the model. Senior leaders emphasized the need for future
strategic sourcing decision analysis to accurately relate both near-term tactical
8 As Yogi Berra once famously remarked when he got lost driving to the Hall of Fame in Cooperstown,
New York, "We're lost, but we're making good time!" (Berra, 1998).
considerations and long-term strategic opportunities and costs in support of overarching
enterprise goals.9
Strategic sourcing process stakeholders identified scalability as a specific
objective important to them, in the sense that data gathering and analysis resources
should be applied corresponding to the magnitude of the potential opportunities, costs
and risks. While very important sourcing decisions may demand significant time and data
resources devoted to help ensure effectiveness, for more routine decisions a single supply
chain analyst armed with the minimum necessary data should be capable of making
effective strategic sourcing decisions.
Having outlined the motivation for the project, specific goals, research
methodology, and limitations, Chapter 2 will provide some background information on
the company, general trends related to global sourcing, and market projections for the
commercial aerospace industry as a whole.
9 The terms strategic, operational and tactical used throughout this work relate to the 'levels of command'
concept within the military. The word strategy derives from the Greek words stratos (army) and ago
(leading), and is the long-term enterprise-level (e.g. Commercial Airplanes) plan of action designed to
achieve a particular goal. The operational level is concerned with linking strategy to tactics, and relates to
the medium-term sequencing, coordination, and resourcing of activities within one area of operations (e.g.
737 Program). Finally, the word tactical comes from the Greek word taktiki, and refers to the actual
techniques employed at the lowest organizational levels on a day-to-day basis (e.g. Procurement Agent,
Final Assembly mechanic, etc.).
2.0 BACKGROUND AND SOURCING CONTEXT
2.1. The Boeing Company
The parent corporation of BCA, The Boeing Company (NYSE: BA) is the world's
largest manufacturer of commercial jetliners and military aircraft combined.
> Revenue: $66.4 billion USD (2007)10
> Headquarters in Chicago, Illinois
> 161,493 employees across the United States and in 70 countries 1
Founded in 1916 in Puget Sound, Wash., The Boeing Company has grown over
nearly a century to become the world's largest, most diversified aerospace company. 12 In
addition to commercial airplanes, The Boeing Company designs and manufactures
rotorcraft, electronic and defense systems, missiles, satellites, launch vehicles and
advanced information and communication systems. Offering products and services to
more than 90 different countries, Boeing is the United States' largest exporter. The
company is divided into two large divisions-Commercial Airplanes, which is the focus
of this thesis, and Integrated Defense Systems.
In the fifty years following World War II, Boeing established a strong legacy of
market dominance in the commercial jetliner industry. The company's early success
came from applying technologies developed on military projects, such as the B-47, to
commercial jets such as the 707 and 720 (Lawrence and Thornton, 2005).
Capitalizing on a strong first-mover advantage following the war, for half a
century Boeing satisfied a tremendous share of global market demand. This has resulted
in Boeing's present-day installed base of nearly 12,000 airplanes, or roughly 75% of all
commercial jetliners in service worldwide.
10 As reported in The Boeing Company 2007 Annual Report.
" As of March 2008 (http://www.boeine.com/employment/employment table.html).
12 Former aerospace companies now part of the Boeing enterprise include: North American Aviation/
Rockwell International (1996), McDonnell Douglas (1997), Hughes Space & Communications (2000),
Jeppesen Sanderson (2000), and Hawker de Havilland (2000).
2.2. Boeing Commercial Airplanes
Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA) is the civil aircraft division of the
corporation, which accounts for approximately 50% of the total company revenue.
> Revenue: $33.4 billion USD (2007)'3
> Headquarters in Renton, Washington
> 65,668 employees 14
The company is organized into three primary business units: 787 program,
Commercial Aviation Services (CAS), and Airplane Programs (AP).
* 787 Program. Based in Everett, Wash., the 787 Dreamliner is Boeing's newest family
of airplanes, expected to enter service in late 2009. The 787 is the world's first mostly
composite commercial airplane. As such, its design incorporates advanced materials,
systems and engines which provide a twenty percent improvement in fuel
performance on a per-passenger basis. Launched in April 2004, the program initially
targeted entry into service for late 2008 but has since been delayed due to supply
chain challenges. Still, the 787 is regarded as the most successful commercial airplane
sales campaign ever (Lococo and Ray, 2008). 15 The work of seventy partner
companies who supply the systems and components has been critical to development
and launch of the 787. As partners, these suppliers have been asked to take on
significantly more responsibility than ever before for managing the extended supply
chain.
* Commercial Aviation Services (CAS). Based in Seattle, Wash., Commercial Aviation
Services operates the industry's largest field service organization, offering support
products and services to the BCA global customer base. The company maintains eight
spare parts distribution centers with inventory for about 500,000 different types of
13 As reported in The Boeing Company 2007 Annual Report.
14 As of March 2008 (http://www.boeing.com/employmentlemployment table.html).
15s As of Feb. 15, 2008, Boeing has 857 orders for the 787 valued at $144 billion from 56 airlines.
parts, processing about 1.8 million spare-parts shipments annually. It also develops,
manages and delivers the vast amount of technical information needed for fleet
maintenance and engineering support.
Airplane Programs (AP). Based in Renton, Wash., Airplane Programs is responsible
for Boeing's main commercial products including the 737, 747, 767 and 777 families
of airplanes and the Boeing Business Jet. In addition, another new product in
development is the 747-8, a larger, more fuel-efficient and technologically advanced
version of the 747.16
In 2005, Commercial Airplanes brought a number of internal organizations
together in support of a fully-integrated production system-from design through
production and delivery-under the leadership of Carolyn Corvi, the Vice
President/General Manager of Airplane Production. 17 With roughly 30,000 employees,
Airplane Programs is responsible for production and final assembly activities in Renton
and Everett, Wash.; component fabrication at Boeing facilities in the United States,
Canada and Australia; and Global Partners.
Among the most important stakeholder organizations for strategic sourcing within
Commercial Airplanes are Boeing Fabrication (which "makes") and Global Partners
(which "buys") the components and services required to build a Boeing airplane.
* Boeing Fabrication. This division is the largest supplier to Commercial Airplanes,
and the largest consolidated operation in the world dedicated to manufacturing
airplane parts, assemblies and tools. Boeing Fabrication employs approximately
13,000 people with manufacturing operations in Auburn, Frederickson and Everett,
Wash.; Portland, Ore.; Salt Lake City, Utah; Oak Ridge, Tenn.; Winnipeg, Canada; as
well as Fisherman's Bend (Melbourne) and Bankstown (Sydney), Australia.
16 A freighter version of the 747-8 is expected to enter service in 2009, followed by a passenger version in
2010.
17 Groups brought together under Airplane Production included: Fabrication, Propulsion, Global Partners,
the Airplane Programs and Final Assembly.
Global Partners. The Global Partners organization is responsible for managing the
company's supply base for procurement of direct materials. As such, the organization
operates in the Seattle, Wash. area near Boeing's final assembly locations, as well as
throughout the world at hundreds of supplier locations.
Altogether, The Boeing Company buys billions of dollars worth of products and
services each year through contracts with 22,000 suppliers and partners globally. The
goods and services fall into the following categories:
Figure 1: Boeing Global Sourcing Categories
1 Avionics Systems communication systems, display systems, cockpitinstruments
2 Electrical/Hydraulic and electrical systems, fuel systems, hydraulic systems,Mechanical Systems control valves, controls, motors, switches
3 Major Outside Production fuselages & body sections, flight control surfaces,/ Major Structures engine structures
4 Purchased Outside sheet metal, non-metallic, machined parts, tubing and
Production / Mfg ducting, etc
5 Propulsion aircraft engines, thrusters
forging, castings, wire bundles, mechanical and
6 electrical adapters, fasteners, microcircuits, retainers,
and sealants
7 Interiors lavatories, interior lighting, carpeting, mats, curtains,
survival kits, etc
maintenance, repair, overhaul services, training, GSE,8 Aerospace Support engineering services
Site/Facilities: services, supplies, operations, equipment,
9 Non-Production Goods maintenance, repairs, construction, and tooling; Supply
and Services Chain Services: employee, financial & business
solutions services
engineering and technical services, software
10 Technical Services development, embedded software, C3, C3, C4ISR,
modeling & simulation, sensors, waveform &
networking
2.3. Global Partners1 8
"Our goal in Global Partners is to take 'real costs' out of the value chain
and take the savings to the market in the form of more competitive
airplane pricing,"
-Steven Schaffer, VP & GM of Global Partners19
Strategic sourcing within Boeing Commercial Airplanes is governed by a cross-
functional executive steering committee consisting of members from approximately
twenty internal stakeholder organizations. 20 The committee is responsible for managing
the structure of the decision-making process and ensuring alignment of sourcing
decisions with overarching business strategies. It is this group's responsibility to engage
appropriate stakeholders and strategy owners, and make sure they are involved in
important sourcing decisions.
A second, subordinate, cross-functional committee of mid-level managers governs
the actual sourcing process itself. The purpose of this group is to integrate and balance
stakeholder interests and company strategies, as well as provide recommendations,
decisions and guidance in order to optimize work placement. In practice, this group
identifies work placement opportunities, facilitates communication between stakeholders,
develops recommendations and supporting rationale, ensures regulatory and policy
compliance, obtains necessary decision approval, and maintains sourcing process
documentation.
For many years, Boeing, like many other North American heavy industry
manufacturers, maintained a large supplier network of sub-tier aerospace contractors who
the company frequently held at arms-length. During this period, Boeing sometimes
awarded contracts to the lowest bidder on the sole basis of price. This practice of supplier
selection and management resulted in a number of associated problems, to include
shirking, poaching and opportunistic renegotiation.
18 Note: The Global Partners organization recently changed its name to Supplier Management. However, I
use the name Global Partners, as the group was titled from 2005-2007 and throughout this research.
19 As quoted by Susan Avery in her article Suppliers are global partners at Boeing (Avery, 2006).
20 The steering committee engages with a broad range of stakeholders responsible for managing areas such
as: airplane production strategy, make/buy, supplier management strategy, airplane program suppliers, new
airplane program suppliers, commercial airplane services suppliers, process improvement, engineering
strategies, market access and industrial participation, human resources, and asset utilization.
While I will explore such risks in greater detail later within the risk management
section, an example of opportunistic renegotiation might involve the bidding system for
contracts. The structure of a system which rewarded the lowest bidder motivated
suppliers to 'race to the bottom' and offer a bid at a price even below their own cost.
Suppliers recognized that, after having won a contract, they could achieve their required
profit margin by later asserting significant additional charges onto the customer for minor
changes in the performance of the contract.
This type of adversarial, 'zero-sum' contest seemed to pit Boeing against its
suppliers. The pressure worked both ways, as evidenced by a dinner conversation in
Seattle between Richard C. Ill, president of Triumph Group, and Carolyn Corvi, head of
Boeing production. Corvi wanted to make certain Triumph was investing enough to make
all the flooring, duct systems and other parts Boeing needs, and that it would cut prices as
production rates rise. Ill replied, "We'll make dollar investments as long as we're sure
we've got the business [from Boeing]" (Greising, 2005).
As described by Property Rights Theory, such a relationship frequently results in
underinvestment by the supplier on the customer's behalf (Grossman and Hart, 1986).
Suppliers are forced to accept risk that in the future Boeing might abruptly decide to
select a different supplier who offered a slightly lower bid. As a consequence, suppliers
are less willing to finance customer-specific investments.
To avoid such negative effects, Global Partners has more recently worked hard to
evolve the company's strategic sourcing practice towards a longer-term vision of
strategic relationships. However, it takes time for trust to develop. Eventually, through a
core supply base of tight-knit key suppliers of end item assemblies, Boeing now seeks to
leverage each supplier's competitive advantages to reinforce Boeing's customer value
proposition. According to Steven Schaffer, the VP of Global Partners, the essence of
Boeing's current sourcing practices are reflected in how the company: a) selects and
views its key suppliers as long-term strategic partners; b) measures and rewards supplier
performance with a balanced scorecard; c) encourages suppliers to move up the value
chain; and d) facilitates supply base self-regulation through supplier councils (Avery,
2006).
Establishing Long-term Strategic Relationships. When first defining the sourcing strategy
for the 787 program back in 2001, a team of Boeing supply managers developed a new
vision of partnering with internal and external suppliers to improve the supply chain.
As part of the strategy, Boeing chose to dramatically trim down the number of
suppliers it works with directly, in order to reshape the value chain. Within five years, the
company had trimmed its supply base (for all plane programs) from 3,800 down to 1,200
suppliers (Avery, 2006). The intent was to establish long-term relationships with key
suppliers and encourage then to work with their own sub-tier suppliers that were
previously directly tied to Boeing. Thus, by turning the company's supply base into
partners rather than merely suppliers providing parts, the thought was that Boeing could
eliminate transaction costs, promote efficiency through the value chain, and help key
suppliers expand their work base to become more competitive (Avery, 2006).
Measuring Supplier Performance. Across both the commercial and defense sides of the
business, The Boeing Company has a well-established standard process to track and
evaluate supplier performance. Through the Boeing Enterprise Supplier Tool (BEST), the
company evaluates the 17,000 top spend (out of 22,000 total) enterprise suppliers through
a composite rating system consisting of three categories: Quality, Delivery, and General
Performance Assessment. 21
Supply Base Self-regulation. As described by Schaffer, "[Boeing and its suppliers] help
each other through the tough times and are always there to meet the next challenge.
Through supplier councils, we actually become accountable to each other, with success as
a team the ultimate goal." (Avery, 2006). In addition to supplier councils, another key
tool designed to facilitate system-wide supply base communication and cooperation is an
electronic information platform known as Exostar.
Exostar is the aerospace and defense industry's online trading exchange, formed
in 2000 by Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon, and BAE Systems. Through a common
and robust information technology platform, Boeing seeks to overcome the challenges
21 The General Performance Assessment seeks to evaluate the degree to which a supplier has appropriate
processes in place to be a top performer (Management, Schedule, Technical, Cost, and Quality).
associated with added complexity and geographic distance that has been incorporated
into the 787 extended supply chain.
Increasing Supplier Responsibilities. For those suppliers selected for the new 787
program, Boeing asked them to take on significant additional responsibilities. Whereas in
the past Boeing provided its suppliers with detailed 'build to print' engineering
specifications, the company now recognizes that doing so may fail to capitalize on the
full potential capabilities of supplier partners. Therefore, as part of the new 787 program,
the company increasingly turns to its suppliers to deliver a higher level of systems and
structures integration, as well as manage their own supply base.
To an unprecedented degree, the suppliers for the 787 Dreamliner share in the
risks and benefits of building the new airplane. Suppliers pay their own up-front costs
related to engineering, facilities, equipment and tooling. Mike Bair, the former VP of 787
Program, described how Boeing increasingly counts on the supply base for required
detailed engineering, by noting: "They are really becoming a true extension of our
engineering and manufacturing system" (Steinke, 2005).
Increasing Outsourcing. Global Partners leadership has communicated a vision of
Boeing's core supplier base as a competitive strength which can offer the company
"around the world technical capability and capacity, access to capital, and enabling
technology and strategic positioning" (Avery, 2006). As part of Boeing's business
strategy to focus on large-scale systems integration (LSSI), as well as engage the world's
best aerospace technologies and manufacturing skills, the company has gradually
increased its percentage of outsourced work and transferred responsibility for detail
engineering designs and production to external suppliers.
A stepwise increase in outsource percentage across all of Boeing's airplane
programs occurred in 2003 when the company sold its commercial aircraft facility in
Wichita, Kansas, along with plants in Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma. 22 As Boeing
increasingly focused on the design and final assembly of its jets in the Puget Sound
22 These facilities have seen become Spirit AeroSystems, a first-tier supplier for both Boeing and Airbus.
region, these factories represented one of the last big chunks of the company that actually
manufactured airplane parts.
Some managers describe a trend toward increased offshoring as an appropriate
and necessary response to the general increase in globalization. Based on the forecasted
demand per region over the next 20 years, there is increasing pressure to develop strong
relationships with governments in developing countries, in order to secure market access
there to support future commercial and military sales. As stated by Shaffer, "Any time we
can match this capability and access airplane sales in a particular region, that translates to
a win/win for our customers, supplier partners and employees" (Avery, 2006). Market
access is a business reality in competing in a global market where Boeing's sales are 70%
overseas. Coincidentally, the 787 consists of approximately 70% outsourced work, much
of which is performed by suppliers spread throughout the world.
Figure 2: 787 Make/Buy Breakdown
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Prichard and MacPherson (2005) counter this view by emphasizing the strategic
risks of dependency and decreased entry barriers when ever-more capability is transferred
to offshore outsource suppliers. To indicate the magnitude and trend of offshore
outsourcing, Prichard and MacPherson point to the dramatic evolution of Boeing's
sourcing strategy for key aircraft components across four airplane programs:23
Figure 3: Offshoring Trend for Boeing Airframes
Airframe 727 767 777 787
Wing US US US Japan
Center Wing Box US Japan Japan Japan
Front Fuselage US Japan Japan JapanUS
Aft Fuselage US Japan Japan Italy
Empennage US US Foreign Italy/US
Nose US US US US
Source: Prichard & MacPherson, 2005
The authors pose the question, thus, to what extent does technology transfer to foreign
companies (particularly Japanese companies) represent a good idea in terms of long-run
economic or industrial effects for the US aerospace industry? How do other alternatives
such as local outsourcing or offshore insourcing relate when considering long-term
strategic and operational value to the enterprise?
2.4. Evolution of Global Sourcing Practices
Over the past two decades, global sourcing strategy has emerged as one of the
most hotly debated management trends. The strategy was initially designed during the
late 1980s and early 1990s when many Western firms were faced with strong
international rivalry and declining competitiveness. United States and European firms
established international purchasing as a key procurement strategy in order to exploit low
cost labor pools and global efficiencies in production. By choosing to buy from a low-
cost country, companies believed they could improve their cost structure and thus help
reverse their decline (Monczka, Trent and Peterson, 2006). While at first most firms
viewed global sourcing simply as a cost-cutting procurement strategy, the concept of
global sourcing has since expanded to mean much more.
23 There has never been any significant foreign content for early models such as the 727. From the 767
onwards, however, foreign supply chain partners have clearly become increasingly important (Prichard &
MacPherson, 2005).
Global sourcing now includes both the management of logistics (identifying
which production units will serve which particular markets and how components will be
supplied for production) and the management of interfaces (among R&D, manufacturing,
and marketing) on a global basis (Kotabe and Murray, 2004). While almost any firm can
now source components and services from venders around the world via the internet, the
true challenge has become effective integration of sourcing, operations, design, and
internal customers located in different countries (Monczka et al., 2006).
Over the past decade, researchers and business managers have increasingly
applied a core competency argument to justify increased levels of outsourcing on a global
basis. Most recently, dramatic increases in the cost of oil, decreases in the value of US
currency, and other unanticipated costs and risks associated with global sourcing have led
many firms to reevaluate their sourcing strategy and seek to operate at the "efficient
frontier" for their acceptable level of risk.24
Global enterprises now focus on developing flexible inter-firm structures that
exploit both internal and external suppliers' competitive advantages, as well as
comparative locational advantages of various countries (Kotabe and Murray, 2004).
Some firms enthusiastically outsource both locally and offshore as part of a 'virtual
enterprise' strategy to gain competitive advantage.
Increased competitive pressure is pushing other companies to view outsourcing as
a strategic necessity to preserve parity with competitors on cost and/or quality (Clemons
and Hitt, 1997).25 This is reflected in data which indicates that, even as firms experience
unanticipated costs and risks26, US-based firms are continuing to increase their level of
global sourcing (Monczka et al., 2006).27
24 From Modern Portfolio Theory, the 'efficient frontier' is the combination of assets offering the best
possible return for a given amount of risk. Conversely, to achieve higher return firms must be willing to
accept higher risk.
25 "A strategic necessity is an activity that must be taken to preserve parity with competitors. They are
complex enough to require careful execution, but there are few barriers to the duplication by competitors
and only limited market imperfections to prevent the acquisition of necessary resources" (Clemons and
Hitt, 1997).
26 In 2007, factories in China were cited as sources of poisonous pet food sold in stores in the United States,
dangerous car tires, and lead paint on the popular Thomas & Friends wooden toys (Story, 2007).
27 Research indicates that by 2010 the total amount US companies spend on foreign goods will represent 41
to 50 percent of their total spend for all goods and materials, compared to 2005 when it was between 31 and
40 percent (Monczka, Trent and Peterson, 2006).
In developing viable sourcing strategies on a global scale, companies must
consider not only manufacturing costs, the costs of various resources, and exchange rate
fluctuations, but also availability of infrastructure (including transportation,
communications, and energy), industrial and cultural environments, the ease of working
with foreign host governments, and so on. Furthermore, the complex nature of sourcing
strategy on a global scale spawns many barriers to its successful execution. In particular,
logistics, inventory management, distance, nationalism, and lack of working knowledge
about foreign business practices, among others, are all major operational problems
identified by multinational companies engaging in international sourcing. Some studies
have shown that despite, or maybe as a result of such operational problems, where to
source major components seems much less important than how to source them (Kotabe
and Murray, 2004).
2.5. Aerospace Market Projections
In general, global demand for commercial airplanes is expected to steadily grow
at 5% annually over the next 20 years, amounting to sales of 28,600 new airplanes worth
approximately $2.8 trillion (Boeing CMO, 2007). It is interesting to note the growing
significance of the Asia-Pacific, Middle Eastern, Latin American, and Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) markets, which together amount to more projected revenue than
North America and Europe combined.
Figure 4: BCA 20-yr Regional Demand Forecast
Market value and airplane deliveries $B Airplanes
Asia-Pacific 1,020 8,350
North America 730 9,140
Europe 660 6,670
Middle East 190 1,160
Latin America 120 1,730
Commonwealth of Independent States (incl. Russia) 70 1,060
Africa 50 490
2006 total $2.8T 28,600
Source: Boeing CMO 2007
Boeing's market demand is dispersed globally, with seventy percent of company
revenue historically coming from customers outside the United States. This percentage is
expected to grow as the overall world economy continues to mature and developing
markets continue to open up.28 Developing countries and regions will likely become more
influential on the world stage as their governments seek to leverage access to their rapidly
growing markets. Consequently, the rivalry between existing industry players may grow
more intense as new entrants seek to join the market currently dominated by Boeing and
Airbus.
The dynamic of increased buyer power, combined with the ongoing industry
pressure to vertically disintegrate, will certainly require Boeing to carefully choose its
strategic position to promote sustained innovation and value capture. To sustain a
competitive advantage, the company will need to support its existing core knowledge
base while carefully selecting new opportunities for innovation and new competencies.
Effective vertical integration decision-making and global sourcing may be among the
most important factors in the ultimate success or failure of Boeing in the future market.29
In summary, Chapter 2 presented a general description of the company and key
internal stakeholder organizations, Boeing's current strategy for strategic sourcing, and
the higher-level context of increasing globalization and outsourcing as a response to cost
pressures and emerging market opportunities. In Chapter 3, I will propose that the first
goal of any strategic sourcing decision should be to reinforce the firm's ability to create,
capture and deliver stakeholder value. A focus on value stream engineering, knowledge
management, competitive positioning, and operational execution-while recognizing
exogenous forces and their influence on otherwise optimal strategies--can enable
purposeful synergy with the overall enterprise architecture and competitive environment.
28 New Open Skies agreements between the European Union and the United States and Canada came into
effect in March 2008, and BCA believes further liberalization is imminent in Asian and North African
markets as governments ease regulations currently restricting market access.29 Fine and Whitney (1996) argue not only that make-buy decisions ought to be a core competence, but that
deciding well what to do and not to do is perhaps the most important core competence of all.
3.0 REINFORCING ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
A central principle of systems dynamics is to examine issues from multiple
perspectives; to expand the boundaries of our mental models to consider
the long-term consequences and "side effects" of our actions, including
the environmental, cultural, and moral implications (Sterman, 2000, p.32).
Beyond creation of unique value, firms must be able to capture value. Focusing
on the dynamic nature of industries, Germany and Muralidharan (2001) highlight what
they consider the greatest challenge of the New Economy: how to bridge the widening
gap between value creation and value capture. 30 In contrast to the more static notion of
Porter (1996), they suggest focusing on developing a dynamic, adaptable strategic plan to
better navigate-and even shape-the emerging rules of the industry.
In Boeing's case, innovation associated with the new 787 Dreamliner has clearly
galvanized customer interest and propelled revenue growth, but it is crucial to recogfiize
that these are simply measures of value creation. If Boeing becomes more vertically
disintegrated and more design and production work is transferred to outsource suppliers,
the company may find it difficult to continue capturing value. Furthermore, as more
design and integration work is offered to suppliers and the industry becomes more
horizontally integrated, key value capture opportunities may shift toward subsystems
(e.g. propulsion, software, etc.).31
3.1. Value Stream Engineering
In order to effectively analyze the true opportunities, costs and risks related to
sourcing a specific product or process, it is necessary to first view it within a larger
system-wide perspective. In addition, if we are to make informed decisions to change a
current sourcing process or design a new process, we must strive to truly understand the
30 Germany & Muralidharan offer the example of Shawn Fanning, a 19-year old computer student who
created tremendous value for millions of online users by allowing them to download free music via peer-to-
peer Napster network. However, he could not find any way to capture any of that value for his company.
General Electric enjoys a 20% profit margin for producing engines (1998-2003 Average Data), compared
to Boeing's 4% for assembling the planes (Piepenbrock, 2005). Other examples of powerful component
manufacturers in other industries after vertical disintegration include Microsoft & Intel in the computer
industry, and Shimano in the bicycle industry.
current state. An effective tool to communicate the current state is an extended value
stream map.
An extended value stream is simply "all of the actions - both value-creating and
wasteful - required to bring a product from raw materials into the arms of the customer"
(Jones & Womack, 2002, p. 1). There are two basic flows: a) orders traveling upstream
from the customer, and b) products coming down the value stream from raw materials to
customer, which together constitute a closed circuit of demand and response.
Figure 5: Example Value Stream
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In knowledge-based industries, the value stream can be visualized more abstractly
as core technology being converted-through some combination of product, process, and
supply chain interactions-into customer value.
Figure 6: Consolidated Enterprise Knowledge-Based Value Stream
Product Architecture
Core Customer
Technology Process Architecture Value
Supply Chain Architecture
At the outset of any strategic sourcing consideration, while seeking to reinforce
the firm's strategic value position, we should begin at the bottom by trying to understand
the value and dynamics of the core technology involved. Next, we should seek to align
product, process, and supply chain dimensions. Finally, we must understand and measure
the customer value created or destroyed as a feedback mechanism to enable adjustment of
the system and increase of customer value over time.
3.2. Knowledge Management and Innovation (Creating Value)
In economics, New Growth Theory demonstrates that it is knowledge which
drives sustainable growth (Romer, 1994). Based on this concept, a firm must create new
knowledge through innovation in order to achieve increasing economic value.
Furthermore, it is the rate of the firm's innovation relative to the industry as a whole
which is fundamental to the ultimate success of a knowledge-based enterprise.
Michael Porter (1998) describes a global environment in which successful
industries naturally develop into 'clusters'. Clusters are basically a system of
interconnected firms and institutions which together amount to more than the sum of its
parts, and develop due to shared common needs for talent, technology, and infrastructure.
Porter specifically defines clusters in the following passage:
Clusters are geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and
institutions in a particular field. Clusters encompass an array of linked industries
and other entities important to competition. They include, for example, suppliers
of specialized inputs such as components, machinery, and services, and providers
of specialized infrastructure. Clusters also often extend downstream to channels
and customers and laterally to manufacturers of complementary products and to
companies in industries related by skills, technologies, or common inputs. Finally,
many clusters include governmental and other institutions-such as universities,
standards-setting agencies, think tanks, vocational training providers, and trade
associations that provide specialized training, education, information, research,
and technical support (Porter, 1998, p.199).
Clusters affect competition in three broad ways: a) by increasing the productivity
of constituent firms or industries; b) by increasing their capacity for innovation and thus
the growth of productivity; and c) by stimulating new business formation that supports
innovation and expands the cluster. The cluster-based paradigm is popular because it
offers a logically compelling, holistic approach to the design and implementation of
supply networks.
The key point for firms such as Boeing is to consider the potential value of
geographic proximity within a strategic sourcing context. This implies significant value
for the enterprise to have its suppliers nearby. The example of the 787 supply chain,
which is more geographically dispersed than prior airplane programs (see Figure 7: 787
Globally Dispersed Supply Chain), may prove to introduce large financial and
opportunity costs and risks beyond what company planners had initially envisioned. In
the future, by designing geographically co-located networks of supplier organizations-
whether internal or outsource suppliers-Boeing could best take advantage of the
positive cluster-based effects of increased productivity and innovation.
Figure 7: 787 Globally Dispersed Supply Chain
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Industry Dynamics. The term clockspeed is defined as "the velocity of change in the
external business environment" (Mendelson & Pillai, 1999, p. 1). Clockspeed is
important to consider as part of strategic sourcing because the faster the technology
clockspeed for a particular product or service, the more risky it is to be fully dependent
on an outside supplier (Fine, 1996). This is because once a supplier or competitor
i urt sd Cnnm~vr
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establishes a lead in a fast clockspeed technology, it may not be possible for the firm to
catch back up.32
Though difficult to calculate precisely, clockspeed can be generally assessed by
examining the rate at which innovators33 introduce substantially new product
technologies (Fine, 1998). 34 In a relative sense, given the long period between new
airplane programs, most metrics suggest the commercial aerospace industry is 'slow
clockspeed'. However, within the industry a number of elements, including advanced
materials technology, electronics, and alternative fuels, are all evolving at a considerably
more rapid pace.
Based on the clockspeed, many industries experience dynamic reconfiguration of
the value chain-like a pendulum swinging back and forth--between vertical integration
and horizontal relationships. Fine (1998) represents this dynamic as a double helix.
Figure 8: Fine's Double Helix
Dynamics of Product Architecture & Value Chain Structure
Source: Fine, 1998.
32 Fine (1996) offers the example of IBM, who lost its commanding market position after outsourcing its
operating system and microprocessor to Microsoft and Intel, respectively.
33 An innovation is "the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or
process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace
organization or external relations." (OECD, 2005, p. 46).
34 Fine (1998) also suggests other measures such as the rate at which capital equipment becomes obsolete,
and the rate at which brand names are established. Other authors have proposed additional measures of
clockspeed, such as: average lifecycle of the sector's products (Blackburn, Guide, Souza & Van
Wassenhove, 2004), and the pace of organizational restructuring (Nadkami & Narayanan, 2004).
Relating this concept to Boeing, after fifty years of being quite vertically
integrated, BCA recently appears to be experiencing pressure to vertically disintegrate.35
Also interesting to note is that Airbus has reported it is planning to sell a number of
factories in Europe, and therefore may be experiencing similar pressure.
As firms dynamically reconfigure and consider outsourcing as a component of the
business strategy, firms should manage the flow of knowledge that leaves the
organization. By outsourcing activities, companies may lose their knowledge concerning
the production of core products. Furthermore, outsourcing of such activities may interact
with a firm's organizational learning, thereby influencing the future definition of the
boundary of what comprises the core activity of the firm.
When firms choose to outsource for knowledge rather than for capacity, they
incur a risk of becoming dependent on the supplier (Fine and Whitney, 1996).
Figure 9: Dependent for Capacity vs. Knowledge
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At the top of the list are the minimal skills needed, which comprise the ability to
write a competent specification, find or develop a competent supplier, and assure oneself
that the specification has been met. These skills are needed regardless of whether the item
is ultimately outsourced or not because they represent a recurring task in product
development (Fine and Whitney, 1998).
35 In June 2005, Boeing sold its Wichita, Kansas factory and two facilities in Oklahoma for $1.5 billion to
Onex Corp., which have gone on to become Spirit AeroSystems (Greising, 2005).
To further illustrate the cause and effect relationships, the following causal loop
diagram depicts how increasing cumulative knowledge within a firm may generate future
knowledge gains. Conversely, we see how outsourcing may generate a downward
reinforcing spiral of a 'knowledge trap.' As shown in the figure below, when the
reinforcing loop organizational learning (RI) dominates the system, more cumulative
knowledge within the firm makes outsource for knowledge less attractive. This leads to a
lower percentage of firm activities outsourced, which results in more value-added work
done internally, and subsequently a higher rate of innovation and new knowledge.
Figure 10: The Outsourcing Knowledge Trap
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Source: Mroczkowski, Pasqual and Villa, 15.871 course assignment, Spring 2008.
Taken the other way, the Org Learning loop (R1) also depicts how a decrease in
cumulative knowledge of the firm increases outsourcing attractiveness, which in turn
results in a higher percentage of outsourcing and lower amount of value-added work done
internally. Because the firm is doing less value-added work internally, the rate of new
knowledge introduction within the firm boundary decreases, which leads to a further
erosion of the cumulative knowledge base--the outsourcing knowledge trap.
The second reinforcing loop, the Hollow Out loop (R2), shows how a decrease in
the amount of value-added work done internally results in less value captured, which
leads to less net income and, in turn, less resources for research and development. This
causes risk-sharing partners to become more attractive, which leads to a greater
percentage outsourcing to them, and even less value-added work done internally.
Based on the industry's current structural dynamics-vertically integrated
duopoly moving toward a disintegrated multi-competitor industry-it appears that the
Hollow Out (R2) loop may increasingly drive the behavior of the system. Boeing,
therefore, might consider a strategy to accept a short-term decrease in profitability
through decreased high-value outsourcing and increased internal investment. As Prof.
Charlie Fine suggests, "when the industry dynamic is moving toward modularity and
vertical disintegration, a company can choose to disintegrate under pressure or
disintegrate gracefully." 36 An example framework which Boeing could use to clearly
communicate what the company will focus on as part of its future strategy divides
products and services into four simple categories: grow, fix, hold and exit.
Figure 11: Strategic Sourcing Courses of Action
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36 This quote is from Prof. Charlie Fine during a 15.769 Operations Strategy lecture on March 4, 2008. His
point emphasized that by carefully selecting what it does and what it wants to do in the future, a firm may
position itself much better to withstand the potentially harmful dynamics of the industry, and even improve
its position within the new industry structure.
Having explored the role of knowledge in value creation, as well as the dynamic
properties inherent in many industries, how does strategic sourcing for companies like
Boeing relate to their ability to capture value?
3.3. Competitive Position (Capturing Value)
As regulation eases and markets become more global, many firms find sustainable
profitability ever more elusive in an increasingly competitive environment. This feeling
of hyper-competition has led many companies to imitate everything about their
competitors. What, then, is the secret to achieving sustainable competitive advantage?
According to Porter (1996), strategy is about creation of unique value through being
different. A company can only outperform rivals by preserving its unique position, which
"arises from both the choice of activities and how they are performed" (Porter, 1996, p.
62). Continued growth is, then, achieved by deepening rather than broadening this unique
position.
Demarco (2001) points out that the culture in many firms is such that when
momentum moves the organization in a given direction, it is taken as strong a priori
evidence that that must be the right direction. 37 However, momentum in some direction
does not necessarily imply carefully planned strategic thinking. While the presumption is
that the direction is a result of effective decision-making by leaders, a company can begin
to move (or be moved) by a process that is more or less drift. As Demarco describes,
Brownian motion38 within the company asserts a net force in some direction and 'By God
we're moving'. The key difference between strategic thinking and drift, therefore, is a
matter of whether the key choices are made mindfully or mindlessly.
Porter (1996) notes that managers often fail to make strategic choices because
trade-offs are frightening, and making no choice often seems preferable than to risk
making the wrong choice. In support of the assertion that a company can achieve distinct
competitive advantage by learning to make thoughtful and effective tradeoffs, a manager
at Apple Inc. attributed the company's success in strategic positioning as "choosing well
37 In some organizations trying to achieve cost reductions, the momentum toward outsourcing may fall into
this category.
38 Brownian motion (named in honor of the botanist Robert Brown) is the random movement of particles
suspended in a liquid or gas or the mathematical model used to describe such random movements, often
called a particle theory (Wikipedia, 2008).
what not to do." For example, compared to other computer companies with a large range
of laptop and desktop product offerings, Apple offers only two versions: standard and
professional. Dell, on the other hand, offers eight different desktop enclosures.
Figure 12: Porter's Alternative Views of Strategy
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* Aggressive outsourcing and partnering to competitors
gain efficiencies * Competitive advantage arises from fit
* Advantages rest on a few key success across activities
factors, critical resources, core * Sustainability comes from the activity
competencies system, not the parts
* Flexibility and rapid responses to all * Operational effectiveness a given
competitive and market changes
Source: Porter (1996)
Transaction Cost Economics. The earliest theory addressing how to model costs related
to the general purchasing or sourcing process is transaction cost economics (Coase, 1937;
Williamson, 1975). 39 One reason why the theory is so important is because it represents
one of the first and most influential attempts to develop an economic theory that seriously
considers the structure of firms and the extent to which they integrate vertically.
The traditional economic theory of the time suggested that, because the market is
"efficient,"40 it should always be cheaper to outsource than to hire. Coase noted,
however, that besides production costs there are a number of transaction costs to using
the market, such as search and information costs, bargaining costs, keeping trade secrets,
and policing and enforcement costs. Coase argues that the size of a firm is a result of
39 While transaction cost economics (TCE) is most associated with the work of Oliver Williamson, he has
built upon earlier work by Nobel laureate Ronald Coase. In a brief but highly influential essay, The Nature
of the Firm, Coase explains why the economy is populated by a number of business firms, instead of
consisting exclusively of a multitude of independent, self-employed people who contract with one another.
40 By "efficient" it is meant that those who are best at providing each good or service most cheaply are
already doing so.
finding an optimal balance between the competing tendencies of these costs.4 1 TCE
theory is built upon two assumptions: bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior.
Bounded rationality refers to the fact that people have limited memories and
limited cognitive processing power. If we can't assimilate all the information at our
disposal, we can't accurately work out the consequences of the information we do have,
and therefore can't compute the expected utility of every alternative action.
In global sourcing, no matter how knowledgeable they might be, managers cannot
consider all the possible alternative courses of action. This is compounded by the fact that
in reaching a decision they must take into account how competitors will react. Thus,
Gigerenzer and Selton (2002) have shown that simple heuristics frequently lead to better
decisions than the theoretically optimal procedure. This is a key assumption because it
may be more appropriate for agents to employ 'rule of thumb' heuristics to make
decisions, rather than apply rigid algorithmic optimization (Simon, 1957).
Opportunism refers to the possibility that people will act in a self-interested way,
or as Williamson puts it, "with guile." That is, people may not be entirely honest and
truthful about their intentions, or they might attempt to take advantage of unforeseen
circumstances that gives them the chance to exploit another party. While not requiring
that all people will act opportunistically all of the time, the assumption is merely that
some people will act opportunistically some of the time, and that you can't tell in advance
who is an opportunist and who is not.
Williamson's contribution has been to specify the variables which determine
whether "market or hierarchy" will have the lower transaction costs in various
circumstances. The three dimensions Williamson uses to characterize costs associated
with any transaction are: frequency, asset specificity, and uncertainty.
1. Frequency. Products or services infrequently used by a firm are unlikely
candidates for performing internally. For example, whether or not a firm retains
attorneys or internal consultants on the payroll relates partly to how frequently
their services are needed.
41 Coase defines the firm boundary by measuring how many contractual relations are "internal" to the firm
and how many "external".
2. Asset specificity. When transactions involve assets much more valuable in the
context of a specific use, transaction costs will tend to be reduced by vertical
integration. We can imagine external suppliers being less willing to invest large
amounts in capital assets specific to one customer, compared to what the customer
would be willing to invest if it owned the process itself.
3. Uncertainty. How difficult is it to foresee the eventualities that might occur
during the course of the transaction? The level of uncertainty can relate to
duration of the transaction, information asymmetries, and the danger of
opportunism.42
There are a number of criticisms of TCE theory. First, it assumes that it is
possible to neatly separate production and transaction costs, while in practice transaction
costs are often hard to define and even tougher to measure. Secondly, while it assumes
bounded rationality, it makes little allowance for other key factors which affect decision-
making (e.g. power). Finally, transactions may be treated in an oversimplified manner, as
though they happen without any knowledge of previous transactions involving the parties
concerned. On the contrary, reputation and trust are often important considerations in the
transactions of successful firms.
Opportunity Cost. A key concept in economics that is very useful when evaluating the
cost and benefit of choices is "opportunity cost," which is the cost incurred (sacrifice) by
choosing one option over the next best alternative. Every action has an opportunity cost.
The concept implies the choice between desirable, yet mutually-exclusive results. While
traditional financial accounting considers revenue and expense cash flows, it fails to
consider opportunity cost.
Typically, opportunity cost is expressed in relative price, or, the price of one
choice relative to the price of another. For example, if a given BCA Machine Fabrication
manufacturing cell could either produce 10,000 aerospace-grade fasteners or 50 overhead
storage bin arches in a month, then the relative price of a stow bin arch would be 200
42 The key question is: Will uncertainty be reduced by vertical integration? And if so, will transaction cost
savings outweigh costs associated with vertical integration?
fasteners. In most cases within an efficient economy, the opportunity cost relates closely
to the monetary cost, but not always. Thus, the relative price can sometimes provide
better insight into the real cost of a good than does the monetary price.
In summary, having considered the importance of a unique position to capture
value, and understanding the role of transaction cost economics and opportunity costs to
help design the boundary of the firm and effectively weigh strategic alternatives, firms
should consider how to design the enterprise to best deliver customer value.
3.4. Operational Execution (Delivering Value)
To be effective, strategic sourcing must incorporate higher-level business
strategy, and a clear vision of how operational and tactical sourcing decisions support that
strategy to create, capture, and deliver customer value. Operational performance and
innovation must not be discounted, as it is precisely that which drives financial results.
Ironically, however, Hammer (2004) notes that in many modern organizations, financial
accounting rather than operations data often dominate the discourse. He relates stories of
thousands of managers from hundreds of companies who describe how senior executives
almost never understand, support, or encourage operational innovation.43
The interactions across the product, process and supply chain dimensions
constitute the firm's "operations." As such, these interactions are extremely important in
delivering value since they relate closely to the core, value-creating work of enterprises.
Examples of the exceptional operations-based value delivery include firms such as Wal-
Mart, Dell and Toyota. These companies succeeded in displacing some of the most
powerful corporations in the history of capitalism (e.g. Sears, IBM, and General Motors)
through their operational excellence and innovation (Hammer, 2004). More recently,
other companies such as Zara, a leading-edge Spanish apparel retailer, have implemented
process and supply chain innovations to reduce costs and working-capital requirements
while simultaneously achieving faster response time than their competition.
Fine (1998) suggests a framework he calls 3-D Concurrent Engineering, which
explicitly considers the interfaces among product, process, and supply chain
43 One business school student remarked: "There seems to be a hierarchy in the business world. Finance
and strategy are at the top, marketing and sales occupy the middle tier, and operations is at the bottom."
(Hammer, 2004, p. 88).
architectures, to simultaneously engineer complimentary designs along all three
dimensions.
Product Engineering. Products can be designed as integral or modular, based on
interchangeability of sub-elements, variability of component interfaces, and the extent to
which a failure of a component can be localized. A product is modular if it consists of a
few well-defined standardized interfaces, such as a component stereo or bicycle. On the
contrary, a custom-built motorcycle or jet engine is an integral product with numerous
tightly integrated custom interfaces designed for exceptional levels of performance.
Research indicates a strong correlation between product complexity and vertical
integration. In a study of the automobile industry, Novak and Eppinger (2001) found that
internal production is more attractive when product complexity is high. They believe this
to be the case because firms often seek to minimize transaction costs and to capture the
benefits of their investment in the skills necessary for coordination and development of
complex designs.
Process Engineering. Processes can be designed as either dedicated, such as batch
fermentation to make penicillin, or flexible, such as flexible manufacturing cells. The
design of the product and the process should be complementary in the sense that a
process should be well-suited to achieve the tolerances specified in the design.
Supply Chain Engineering. According to Fine (1998), there are four dimensions which
can be seen to relate distance in supply chains-geographic, organizational, cultural, and
electronic.
1. Geographic. This dimension refers to physical distance and is very important in
the design of efficient just-in-time (JIT) supply chains, due to the requirements of
frequent deliveries. Geographic proximity can also make coordination and
communication much easier during design phases when integrated teams from
different firms must work together.
2. Organizational. Commonality of goals is referred to as organizational
proximity, and is achieved when suppliers and customers have similarly vested
interests in the performance of the system. This may be achieved through joint
ownership, for example, or through otherwise aligned incentive structures.
3. Cultural. This includes elements such as language, laws and business
standards, and ethics.
4. Electronic. Lastly, the electronic dimension refers to information exchange via
internet and electronic data interchange (EDI), which can greatly assist in
overcoming distance on the geographic, organizational, and cultural dimensions.
Supply chains can be an integral network such as Toyota City in Nagoya, Japan,
or a modular network, such as moviemakers in Hollywood. 44 The enterprise goal should
be to match corresponding product, process, and supply chain architectures-to have an
integral supply chain in support of an integral product, and likewise a modular supply
chain in support of a modular product.
In contrast to an integral supply chain which has close linkages, a modular supply
chain may exhibit low proximity along one or more of the four dimensions. They can
exist over huge geographic distances, have separate ownership control, have little cultural
commonality, and exchange very little data electronically. Either respective supply chain
architecture can be effective based on the product context. For example, Dell Inc. has
achieved tremendous success through a well-designed modular supply chain of
interchangeable arms-length suppliers, flexible assembly processes involving mainly
manual labor rather than automation, and a modular product design with well-defined
standard interfaces.
In general, as supply chains become extended along any of the four dimensions,
costs tend to increase and new risks are introduced. Along the geographic dimension, the
increase in cost related to transportation, logistics, and tariffs is relatively straightforward
to identify and calculate. However, a lack of organizational and cultural proximity can be
44 Note that the most integral supply chain possible is by definition a vertically integrated enterprise.
not only more difficult to appreciate, but also much more difficult to overcome. The
Internet and the Web can be helpful in overcoming the effects of geographic distance, but
there is still no substitute for face-to-face contact.45
Velocity. Some experts describe velocity4 6 as the most important measure of
manufacturing performance, and the single best indicator of lean manufacturing. The
reality is that when companies employ global sourcing, supply chains grow longer, more
uncertain, and generally less efficient (La Londe, 2006). This results in substantial cost
increases for transportation, manpower, warehousing, and IT support. While a low-
velocity supply chain does not necessarily translate to lower customer service-if
obsolescence risk is low and sufficient inventory is kept on hand-it is necessary to
accurately assess the added cost of keeping customers happy in a low-velocity supply
chain.
Through mathematical modeling, Prof. Jay Forrester attributed oscillatory
behavior in production-distribution systems to be primarily caused by inherent delays in
the system (Forrester, 1961). Longer lead times require more inventory and warehousing
in the pipeline (increased cost), and if multiple intermodal exchanges take place, the
product is more likely to be damaged, delayed, or lost (increased risk). Other questions
that extend beyond cost include supply chain adaptability to change or disruptions. As
each node in the supply network builds buffer inventories to manage variability,
inventories at each channel node become subject to the infamous "bullwhip" effect.4 7 As
lead times cascade down the supply chain, the ability of supply chains to serve an
increasingly.demanding customer becomes ever more inadequate.
Boeing has invested a large amount of resources in information technology, which
has helped reduce processing delays to a certain extent. However, there are other
significant delays inherent to sourcing from external suppliers. For example, in order to
increase a supplier's rate of delivery, it may require additional capacity investment. This
45 "Take the look in the customer's eye when you tell him a new price," says Thomas W. Malone of the
MIT Sloan School of Management. "That's very useful information" (Garreau, 1999).
46 The term 'velocity' used in manufacturing refers to 'time required to get through the factory' (i.e. speed),
not a vector quantity in the physics sense.
47 The Bullwhip Effect is an observed phenomenon in forecast-driven distribution channels. Oscillating
demand is magnified upstream through a supply chain, such that it reminds one of a cracking whip.
may mean airplane production rates would be required to be sustained at a higher level
for sufficient time so that the supplier would recoup its investment.
Union /Labor Relations. Organized labor unions, as they relate to the supply of skilled
labor, may be an important influence on where to source. Over the last decade, increasing
globalization has prompted a struggle between US manufacturing firms and labor unions
regarding compensation and work flexibility. This has resulted in more firms choosing to
place work in geographic locations (both domestically and abroad) that offer reliable,
flexible, and reasonable-cost skilled labor pools. In the US, this can lead to work
placement in "right to work" states where conflict with trade unions may be less likely.48
Examples of this trend may include the decision by 787 fuselage contractor Global
Aeronautica49 to locate in South Carolina, as well as the decision by Northrop Grumman-
EADS to manufacture US Air Force KC-30 refueling tankers in Alabama. 50
Figure 13: US States with Right-to-Work Laws
48 Right-to-work laws are statutes enforced in twenty-two U.S. States, mostly in the southern or western
U.S., allowed under provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, which prohibit agreements between trade unions
and employers making membership or payment of union dues or "fees" a condition of employment, eitherbefore or after hiring (Wikipedia, 2008).
49 Global Aeronautica is a 50/50 joint venture of Alenia North America, Inc. and Vought Aircraft
Industries, Inc. which has been contracted to assemble, integrate, test and apply surface finishes to more
than 60 percent of the 787 fuselage prior to shipment to Boeing's final assembly facility in Everett, Wash.50 As part of a February 2008 contract to Northrop Grumman-EADS, Airbus will begin building all itsA330 freighters at a new Mobile, Alabama plant once the deal proceeds (Shalal-Esa, 2008).
Some firms view offshore outsourcing as a hedging strategy against the risk of
supplier hold-up from domestic labor unions. One such example appears to be the US
auto industry. In riecent years, American Axle & Manufacturing (AAM) strategically
increased its production capacity offshore in Mexico, China, Brazil, Poland the UK. An
ongoing UAW strike which began in Feb. 2008 led to a transfer of some work to AAM's
plant in Mexico. The CEO Dauch was quoted as saying: "We have the flexibility to
source all of our business to other locations around the world, and we have the right to do
so" (Walsh, 2008).
3.5. Exogenous Forces
In the case of many industries, exogenous factors originating from 'outside the
system' play an important role influencing strategic souring decisions. Such forces may
relate to governmental intervention, a desire to secure market access, or other external
motivations. In the case of Boeing, employee interviews indicated a perception that such
factors may occasionally outweigh all others in relative importance.
Commercial and Military Offsets. The concept of "offset agreements" originated in
western Europe during the aftermath of World War II. Post-war Europe was struggling
with civil reconstruction costs and found it difficult to cope with the high economic cost
inherent in development and modernization of their indigenous military capability. In
order to assist, the United States sponsored military and economic grants (such as the
Marshall Plan) to help nations achieve the stability necessary to assure they would not
collapse. Today, offset in projects requiring high technology such as aerospace and
defense is based on the inflow of dollars to compensate for deficits that might arise in the
recipient country's national budget, or transfer of work to stimulate technology
development in the recipient country.
Increased competition has allowed customers to gradually demand more and more
compensation in exchange for US military hardware purchases (US Bureau of Industry
and Security, 2007). As categorized by Boeing: Direct offsets transfer purchasing dollars
and/or work and military technology (often through licensing or joint production) to
recipient countries to produce a US weapon system, or its components. Indirect offsets
may involve investments in the purchasing country, counter-trade agreements, or
transfers of commercial technology (Boeing, 2001).
This dynamic is particularly true in developing countries with less industrialized
economies, which pursue indirect offsets to help create profitable commercial businesses
and build their infrastructure. One example of a wide-ranging indirect offset obligation
involved Boeing's $1.8 billion sale of F/A-18 fighters to Spain in 1982. This contract
included $1.5 billion in indirect offsets, such as agreements to market Spanish-made steel
coils, chemicals, sunflower seed oil, sailboats, paper products, zinc and marble in the
United States (Boeing, 2001).
Occasionally, a portion of the Boeing IDS offset obligations is fulfilled by
Commercial Airplanes, through placement of manufacturing work in the country or
through other non-manufacturing investment. Recently, Ian Q.R. Thomas, President of
Boeing India, described that in India, "Boeing has incurred significant offset obligations
on the civil side" (Bhargava, 2007). Specifically, Boeing committed to investing $100
million in a Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) facility in Nagpur, $75 million for
a new pilot and flight crew training school, and $10 million to help fund existing pilot
training schools in India.
In Chapter 3, we discussed the importance for strategic sourcing to serve as part
of a higher-level enterprise strategy to create, capture, and deliver value. In Chapter 4, we
will explore some of the tradeoffs of global sourcing alternatives, outline various
approaches to quantify costs, and emphasize the importance of effective risk management
as an integral part of the process.
4.0 GLOBAL SOURCING AS A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
Many contemporary discussions of global sourcing interweave various pros and
cons of outsourcing and offshoring into a one-dimensional perspective (e.g. why firms
should outsource, or why firms should vertically integrate). Such analysis thereby offers
an incomplete picture, useful only in support of one particular sourcing context and
strategy. In contrast, based on my research as part of this study, I am convinced that there
is no "optimal" global sourcing strategy for every firm-just as there is no best business
strategy in general. Rather, the objective of each firm should be to develop a global
sourcing strategy that complements its unique business strategy goals and industry
context for a specific product or service offering.
Thus, to consider how a firm may use global sourcing as a competitive advantage
based on each unique context, we should therefore first attempt to isolate the relative
opportunities, costs and risks that relate to alternative scenarios along the vertical
integration (insourcing vs. outsourcing) and geographic/political (domestic vs.
offshoring) dimensions. Before doing so, it is first necessary to recognize that benefits
arising from scale, scope, and specialization can be captured through either vertical
integration or outsourcing, domestically or abroad, depending on the circumstances.
* Economies of scale. When for any reason average costs decline as production
increases.5
* Economies of scope. When the total costs of producing several related goods or
services together are lower than the sum of the costs of producing them separately. 52
* Economies of specialization. When the cost of performing only one activity is lower
than the cost of performing that activity as one of a portfolio of activities.53
51 Examples through which economy of scale can be achieved include: dividing fixed development efforts
over a larger production scale, accommodating large random variation in demand from any one client over
a larger and more stable set of clients, or having dedicated facilities and longer run lengths and thus fewer
line changes and reduced down-time resulting from changeovers.
52 For example, Microsoft enjoys an economy of scope as developer of operating systems and many of the
applications packages that run under them.
53 Benefits of this type come from doing only one process or major assembly item and (as a result of
increased focus) doing them better or more efficiently with fewer levels of management coordination than
needed in a more diversified organization.
4.1. Vertical Integration vs. Outsourcing
Based on supply management data collected annually throughout the 1990s and
global sourcing data collected in the 2000s, the primary factor affecting most firms'
decision to source globally continues to be cost-related (i.e. best price/cost, internal
margin or profitability requirements, labor cost and availability) (Monczka et al., 2006).
The table below outlines some of the other commonly cited benefits of each alternative.54
Figure 14: Vertical Integration vs. Outsourcing
Vertical Integration Advantages
* Coordination/Control of Vertical
Activities: creates synergies; facilitates
communication of detailed design
requirements and scheduling
* Barriers to Entry: enhanced scope of
activities, potentially high fixed costs
* Property Rights: capture all benefits from
value chain activities performed
* Knowledge Specialization: deeper talent
pool
* Knowledge Management: manage and
protect intellectual property
* Control Inputs & Markets: protect
quality and access
* Strategic Depth: investment in
specialized assets; differentiation
* Decreased Cost: avoid supplier search
time and contract negotiation; reduce
inventory reqt
Outsourcing Advantages
* Decreased Cost: access to economies of
scale, more efficient equipment, less
overhead, etc.
" Strategic Agility: decreased capacity and
obsolescence risk; transferred to supplier
* Reduced Time to Market: accelerate
product development/production via
supplier capability
* Access Knowledge: supplier intellectual
property, experience, knowledge, and
operational best practice
Access Talent: larger talent pool
Decrease Operating Leverage: ratio of
fixed costs to variable costs; more
predictable variable costs
* Operational/Financial Risk Management:
via supplier partner
* Improve Quality: via supplier capability
* Contract: legal redress for non-performance
* Commodification: standardization of
products and processes
Vertical integration can be an effective strategy when used prudently. It has the
potential to enrich a firm's new product development because it provides the opportunity
to integrate tacit knowledge with complementary assets across different value chain
activities (Teece, 1986). In technologically advanced industries, where suppliers often
54 In general, what is an advantage for the one represents a corresponding disadvantage for the alternative.
control vitally important new technology, internalizing these technological capabilities
affords control and assures access to the knowledge necessary to build a portfolio of
products based on cutting-edge technology (Afuah, 2001).
As opposed to a policy of either vertical integration or complete outsourcing,
another alternative is the simultaneous pursuit of vertical integration and strategic
outsourcing. This hybrid approach has been termed taper integration and describes
"when firms are backward or forward integrated but rely on outsiders for a portion of
their supplies or distribution" (Harrigan, 1984, p. 643). Taper integration can combine the
benefits from vertical integration, such as economizing on transaction costs (Williamson,
1975), with those from strategic outsourcing--such as increased flexibility and access to
knowledge and operational best practice external to the firm (Powell, Koput, and Smith-
Doerr, 1996). The right balance of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing can
enhance a firm's product portfolio and product success, which contributes to competitive
advantage and overall firm performance (Rothaermel, Hitt, & Jobe, 2006).
4.2. Domestic vs. Offshoring
Aside from the question of whether activities are done internally or by an outside
supplier, what leads firms to develop internal facilities abroad and/or prefer sourcing
from suppliers located in offshore locations? In order to make an informed decision to
outsource from an offshore supplier, a firm must understand the total costs-expected
production and transaction costs, as well as potential added costs due to additional
risks-of an offshore project.
The risks and complexities of offshore sourcing can be very large compared with
domestic sourcing. These may relate to political atmosphere, tariff barriers, variations in
ethical and quality standards, currency exchange rate, cultural and communication
obstacles, etc. (Min, LaTour, & Williams, 1994). While a foreign supplier's production
cost levels are likely to be lower, and the quality of its products may or may not be
higher, the transaction cost levels related to international transactions are almost always
higher (Rangan, 2000).
Figure 15: Domestic vs. Offshoring
Domestic Advantages
* Decreased Cost: less transaction costs related
to geographic (possibly cultural) proximity;
Porter's Cluster Theory
* Political Pressure: domestic government
incentives; satisfy labor union
* Access Knowledge: if only available
domestically
Knowledge Management: manage and protect
intellectual property (based on laws)
* Risk Management: reduce operational risks
associated with transportation and logistics
* Knowledge Specialization: develop cluster-
based talent pool
Offshoring Advantages
* Decreased Cost: labor arbitrage
. Political Pressure / Market Access: foreign
governments demands regarding strategic
industries
" Access Knowledge: if only available offshore;
includes knowledge of customer
. Time Zone: seamlessly accomplish sequential
task during normal day shift, using different
time zones available 24x7; also possible
between earth's hemispheres of summer/winter
* Risk Management: reduce systematic risk due
to currency fluctuation, natural disasters, acts of
war, terrorism, etc.
Thus, effective global sourcing strategy is a complex balancing act between
numerous relevant factors-lower production costs abroad versus lower transaction costs
locally, foreign market access versus local labor interests, capacity investment cost versus
erosion of internal knowledge and capacity.
4.3. Assessing Cost
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) is a "purchasing tool and philosophy which is
aimed at understanding the true cost of buying a particular good or service from a
particular supplier" (Ellram, 1995). It is used primarily for supplier selection and
evaluation.
Beginning in the late 1980s, researchers began to advocate management of
supplier selection from a total cost standpoint rather than focusing on the purchase price.
Monckza and Trecha developed the Supplier Performance Index (SPI), introducing a
"non-performance cost" factor to account for additional costs incurred by the purchaser to
correct deficiencies related to quality, delivery or price (Monckza and Trecha, 1988).55
During the 1990s, a number of authors proposed different variations of a total cost
of ownership (TCO) concept.
55 The Supplier Performance Index (SPI) is a uniform business-wide supplier rating system where past
supplier performance on quality and delivery are captured and quantified using an index technique. The SPI
formula includes a statistical normalizing method to correct for the basis of large dollar suppliers.
Figure 16: Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) Approaches
Author Year Approach
Suppliers' value should be defined in terms of:
- cost of purchasing
Carr and Ittner 1992 - cost of holding inventory
- cost of poor quality
- cost of delivery failure
Divide total costs into two categories:
External Internal
- price - inventory cost
- discount term - delivery expediting cost
Smytka and Clemens 1993 - ordering costs - line down cost
- transportation - non-conformance cost
- supplier visits
- tooling
- technical support
Divide total costs into three categories:
Eliram 1993 - pre-transaction
- transaction
- post-transaction
A summary of some of the key benefits of adopting a TCO philosophy are that
TCO analysis (Ellram, 1995):
* provides a consistent supplier evaluation tool, improving the value of supplier
performance comparisons among suppliers and over time;
* helps clarify and define supplier performance expectations both in the firm and
for the supplier;
* provides a focus and sets priorities regarding the areas in which supplier
performance would be most beneficial (supports continuous improvement),
creating major opportunities for cost savings;
* improves the purchaser's understanding of supplier performance issues and cost
structure;
* provides excellent data for negotiations;
* provides an opportunity to justify higher initial prices based on better
quality/lower total costs in the long run; and
* provides a long-term purchasing orientation by emphasizing the TCO rather than
just price.
It is important to note that none of the organizations studied use total cost of
ownership (TCO) tools for all purchases. The use of TCO is reserved for certain
items/services where the organization feels that such analysis can provide greatest
benefit. TCO tools have proven difficult to apply in practice, and have been adopted by
only a limited number of firms. One of the principal barriers is lack of readily available
accounting and cost data. This is due the use of traditional cost accounting for allocating
costs (Ellram, 1993). Another barrier is the complexity of TCO modeling. TCO costs are
often situation-specific, and the relevant cost factors for decision-making vary on the
basis of many factors. Finally, the lack of a standardized approach serves as a barrier to
broad implementation. TCO models in use vary widely by company, and research
indicates that models frequently vary within companies depending on the buy class
and/or item purchased (Ellram, 1995).
To overcome these challenges, organizations must employ appropriate metrics to
gather required data, develop a simple and standardized TCO approach, and offer user
training and education in support of TCO efforts. A cultural change may also be
necessary for the firm to move away from a 'lowest price' orientation, towards maximum
value / total cost understanding. The need for cultural change is a major reason why TCO
is regarded as a philosophy, rather than as merely a tool.
Other approaches have been to combine TCO and activity-based costing to
develop a framework that allocates relevant sourcing costs according to the resources
consumed by supply chain and purchasing activities (Degraeve, Labro, & Roodhooft,
2005). Also, another method used to inform decision-makers in supplier selection and
evaluation is zero-base pricing (or, "should cost" modeling). Zero-base pricing focuses
primarily on understanding the supplier's pricing structure and the supplier's cost of
doing business (Burt, Norquist & Anklesaria, 1990).
Life Cycle Costing. Life Cycle Costing (LCC) is "a way of thinking where attention is
paid to the total costs that occur during a product's entire life cycle." (Lindholm and
Suomala, 2005). Total costs can be considered in different ways - from the standpoint of
the product's supplier/manufacturer or the product's owner or end-user, or even more
broadly from the perspective of society as a whole. The concept of life cycle costing
suggests that: a) the total costs of a product can be influenced beforehand, and b) the
various cost factors are interrelated.
The premise that total costs of a product can be influenced beforehand has been
validated through widespread successful implementation of Target Costing by Japanese
firms since the 1960s. 56 Target costing systems first identify the cost at which the product
must be manufactured if it is to achieve its profit objective and then create a disciplined
environment to help ensure that the target cost is achieved (Cooper and Slagmulder,
1997).
The second basic principle that cost factors are interrelated can be clearly
illustrated through a simple example. If a Boeing supplier uses more expensive but lighter
materials when manufacturing an aircraft component, it can lead to a significant decrease
in airline costs due to lower fuel consumption, plus potential benefit to society by
diminishing environmental pollution.
Thus, to achieve global rather than local cost reduction, it is necessary to evaluate
how cost factors interact and accumulate among the relevant stakeholders during the
different life cycle stages. Furthermore, knowing the life cycle costs of a product is
fundamental to considerations of either outsourcing functions or offering capacity for use
by other organizations in the value stream (i.e. vertical integration decision-making)
One criticism of LCC is that it may allow under-emphasis of pre-transaction
costs, since it may focus users primarily on the costs of purchasing and operating capital
equipment or fixed assets.
Management Accounting. Financial value analysis for global sourcing must support a
goal of making informed business decisions for the future. Unfortunately, traditional
accounting methods are based on historical estimates and designed to adhere to GAAP
accounting standards. This makes traditional cost accounting better suited for mass
56 The Japanese approach to target costing appears to have been developed at Toyota in the early 1960s
(Monden, 1995). Some even consider Target Costing to be one of the major management practices
sustaining the competitive advantage of Japanese enterprises (Koga and Matsuo, 1996).
production rather than "Lean" organizations, as the traditional accounting metrics can
frequently contradict the benefit of lean improvements. 57
A more efficient and pragmatic method known as "Lean accounting" has
therefore been created to support process design and improvement. Based on principles
of management accounting, no overhead allocation for joint resources is applied within
decision-making, since it frequently leads to erroneous insight. Rather, accounting cost
considerations are limited to those costs which are "unique," meaning directly
attributable to the activities involved.
4.4. Risk Management
Understanding and mitigating risk in the supply chain is vital to architecting a
robust network that can ensure a steady stream of inputs and avoid costly disruptions. A
careful examination of risks can help screen potential candidate suppliers and help guide
the decision of which activities to outsource and which to keep inside the firm. Once
specific threats have been listed and prioritized, it is possible to effectively use that risk
assessment to help choose suppliers, as well as to design contracts that manage the
associated risks.
Recognizing that only a certain portion of risks can be mitigated through
contracts, the residual uncontrollable risks are useful to screen which candidate value
chain elements are appropriate for outsourcing and which should be kept in house.58
Seldom well understood or clearly articulated, risks related to strategic outsourcing
decisions often create their own problems for both buyer and seller. Buyers' risks include
risk of overpaying, risk of damage to reputation resulting from inferior service, and risk
of loss of control over vital assets. On the other hand, sellers' risks include under-
charging as a result of contracting error, as well as other risks.
There are some activities which are strategic by their nature and should not be
outsourced. As described by Clemens and Hilmer (1997):
57 For example, traditional accounting treats inventory as an asset on the balance sheet. Thus, a reduction in
inventory results in reduced net income on the income statement.58 Some residual unanticipated risk will always remain. In decision analysis, an "unknown unknown" is an
uncertainty that is unanticipated and, hence, unaccounted for in a formal decision model.
In medieval castles the most secure part of the castle, used in time of siege to
protect the wealth and the family of the lord of the manor, was termed the keep.
Those activities that must be protected - those whose loss would result in
unacceptable economic damage and, perhaps, to failure of the firm - must be
protected and deserve to be placed in the central keep of the firm.
Quinn and Hilmer (1994) suggest that activities which represent core
competencies cannot be outsourced and that non-core activities are candidates for
outsourcing. Clemens and Hitt (1997) argue, however, that the definition of a core
competency has never been clear or unambiguous, and the idea itself can lead to poor
outsourcing decisions. 59 Two cases examples which they point to are airline computer
reservation systems (CRSs) and aircraft maintenance. Travel agent computer reservation
systems would not appear to be part of serving passengers or flying planes, and thus not
core to airlines. Yet, some major failures in the airline industry such as PanAm and
Eastern (both of which collapsed in 1991) represented airlines which chose not to invest
in and develop such non-core systems. 60 Conversely, aircraft maintenance would appear
to be a core activity for an airline, without which it would be unsafe to fly. Yet, many
airlines safely continue to outsource maintenance from other, larger carriers, such as
American Airlines, Lufthansa, and Swiss Air.6'
Clemens and Hitt (1997) suggest risk-based screens for identifying 'keepers':
Screen 1: A firm should consider an activity to be a keeper if the size of the economic
loss that can result from an outsourcing contract is too great to absorb and if the loss,
should it occur, would destroy the firm. 62
59 If a core competence is thought of as an activity that represents a skill shared by all divisions of a
conglomerate, then a core activity can be as much an aspect of corporate culture as it is a skill.60 AMR's SABRE and United Airlines' Apollo in the early 1980s were more profitable for American and
United than were the business of serving travelers by operating an airline (Clemens & Hitt, 1997).
61 Clemens and Hitt (1997) note that the risks of outsourcing maintenance service are, paradoxically, much
less than the risks of outsourcing reservations service. Alternative providers of maintenance service prevent
hold-up, and an airline would switch providers at contract renewal time if its provider attempted to impose
unfair charges.
62 The first screen does not exploit Modem Portfolio Theory or other risk reduction techniques based upon
diversification, and thus is extremely conservative.
Screen 2: A firm should consider an activity to be a keeper if the size of the expected
economic loss that can result from an outsourcing contract exceeds the expected
economic gains.
While these screening mechanisms may seem intuitive, applying them in practice
is quite difficult. Defining loss is relatively easy. We can define the expected potential
loss from outsourcing and activity simply as the magnitude of the exposure times the
probability of loss. 63 However, defining all the ways that damage can occur is seldom
easy. Exposure includes possible damages, such as overcharges, deliberate under-
performance of critical tasks resulting in loss of customer good-will, and others that we
have not yet discussed. Likewise, determining the probability of loss likewise is seldom
easy, even for those losses that have been identified.64
Often when considering outsourcing decisions, most decision-makers have not
known how to enumerate expected costs or how to assess their magnitude or their
likelihood. Therefore, these rules for guiding outsourcing decisions have not been
followed, and ad hoc assessments of strategic and non-strategic activities have been the
norm.
Specific actions of one party, damaging to the interests of the other, usually fall
into one of three categories: shirking, poaching, and opportunistic renegotiation (Clemens
and Hitt, 1997). These three categories of risks may impose additional costs upon parties
to inter-firm relationships, which are included in the category of costs called transaction
costs (see Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; or Williamson, 1975).
Shirking represents deliberate under-performance on a task that is difficult to
measure, while still claiming full payment as if the task had been fully accomplished
and had been completed in accordance with agreed upon standards of performance.
63 To be precisely correct, in place of expected loss the evaluations should use the smaller of two quantities,
either: a) expected loss without any contractual attempt at mitigation of risk; and b) expected loss after
contractual risk reduction, less the real costs of the risk reduction mechanisms employed (Clemens and
Hitt, 1997).
64 Many potential sources of loss can be eliminated by effective contracting, other potential sources of loss
can be rendered unlikely, but unanticipated environmental changes can create unanticipated opportunities
for exploitation that were not protected against in the outsourcing contract.
* Poaching represents the theft and subsequent misuse of information or training and
expertise, given in trust for the accomplishment of a specific purpose, now used for
the gain of the recipient of the information and to the detriment of the giver.
* Opportunistic renegotiation becomes possible when either party comes to enjoy an
unanticipated increase in power. The party with power can exploit the strategic
vulnerability of the other; for example, the client can decide to pay less, or the vendor
can demand more.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. Given the variety of risks inherent to strategic
sourcing decisions, firms need to incorporate an effective methodology to systematically
rate potential risks relative to each other. The process should enable firms to first
recognize those risks with the highest potential impact, and then facilitate actions to
reduce or avoid the risk. In most circumstances, firms are forced to accept some level of
risk. Therefore, the goal of the organization in risk analysis should be to effectively
understand when and how much risk it is accepting, in order to make informed judgments
about risk-reward tradeoffs.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a widely used tool within
manufacturing industries. First introduced formally by the US Armed Forces in the late
1940s, FMEA was later adopted within the aerospace/rocket industry to avoid costly
errors on projects such as the Apollo Space program. Since then, many companies have
incorporated FMEA as an effective risk analysis tool related to product design. For
example, Toyota has incorporated the FMEA principles within a process it uses called
Design Review Based on Failure Modes (DRBFM).6 5 In the case of strategic sourcing, it
is possible to employ the same fundamental FMEA process toward supply chain design.
In FMEA, failures are prioritized according to how serious their consequences
are, how frequently they occur and how easily they can be detected. A FMEA also
documents current knowledge and actions about the risks of failures, for use in
continuous improvement.
65 A comprehensive, well-done FMEA can be considered a prerequisite for a DRBFM; the DRBFM need
only be implemented when design changes occur.
* Step 1: Severity. List and assign a 'Severity Rating' (1 = no danger, to 10 =
important) to all failure modes, based on functional requirements and their effects. A
failure 'effect' is defined as the result of a failure mode on the function of the system
as perceived by the user. If the severity of an effect has a number 9 or 10, consider
actions to eliminating the failure mode, if possible, or protect the user from the effect.
* Step 2: Occurrence. List and assign a 'Occurrence Rating' (1 = never, to 10 = certain)
for all causes of a failure based on how likely it is to occur. This can be done by
looking at similar scenarios and the failures that have been documented for them. All
potential causes for a failure mode should be identified and documented.
* Step 3: Detection. List and assign a 'Detection Rating' to each combination from the
previous two steps, based on the ability of planned tests and inspections to detect the
failure mode prior to its occurrence.
After these 3 basic steps, a Risk Priority Number (RPN) ranging from a low of 1
to a high of 1000 is calculated for each failure mode and its resulting effect(s).
RPN = Severity Rating x Occurrance Rating x Detection Rating
Using the RPNs, it is easy to determine the areas of greatest concern. The failure
modes that have the highest RPN should be given the highest priority for corrective
action. Recommended actions with targets, responsibility and dates of implementation
should be noted. These actions can include specific inspection and testing of a potential
supplier or their quality procedures, redesign (such as selection of a new supplier), adding
more redundancy (maintaining internal production or dual outsourcing) or limiting
environmental stresses (slower production ramp-up). Once the actions have been
implemented in the design/process, the new RPN should be checked, to confirm the
improvements.
The best size for an FMEA team is 4 to 6 people, carefully selected, based on the
contribution they can make to the specific FMEA. An FMEA team should represent a
cross-section of the company in terms of functional responsibility and level in the
organization. Team members should typically come from: Manufacturing, Engineering,
Materials/Purchasing, R & D, Maintenance, Quality, Tech Service, Customers, and
Suppliers.
There are a number of common pitfalls related to implementation of FMEA. First,
it prioritizes but doesn't correct, which requires someone to act based on the information.
Second, the tool is only as good as the team. Third, it is time consuming to get into the
details, which demands sufficient time allocation. Fourth, there will always be so called
'unknown unknowns' due to either missing a failure mode or based on an effect outside
the experiences of the company. Finally, not including the right people, such as operators,
customers, and suppliers, may fail to incorporate otherwise unknown failure modes and
an "outsider" perspective that may prove useful in facilitating integration with other
systems and continuous improvement.
In Chapter 4, we discussed the tradeoffs of global sourcing alternatives, numerous
approaches to assessing cost, and the use of risk management (specifically FMEA
analysis) as a methodology to help recognize and develop effective strategies to manage
risk in global sourcing. Chapter 5 presents the "current state" analysis of the strategic
sourcing decision process within BCA, and proposes a decision-support model to
facilitate standardization and support continuous process improvement.
5.0 DECISION SUPPORT MODEL FOR GLOBAL SOURCING
"Modeling is not a one-shot activity that yields The Answer, but an
ongoing process of continual cycling between the virtual world of the
model and the real world of action." (Sterman, 2000, p. 89).
Modeling is the process of representing a system with a model that is easier to
understand than the actual system. The model should be clear, comprehensive, and
accurate, so that its users can rely on its representation to understand system
functionality, analyze its various postures, and predict its future behavior. Capturing
important feedbacks is more important than a lot of detail in the specification of
individual components (Sterman, 2000, p. 96). Representing the system implies
incorporating system elements, relationships, goal, inputs, controls, and outputs.
Effective modeling of a system has two prerequisites: a) understanding the
structure of the actual (real-world) system and the functionality and characteristics of
each system component and relationship, and b) choosing the appropriate modeling
technique for representing the underlying real-world system. Based on budgetary and
time constraints, the model should be practically and economically feasible as well as
beneficial in meeting the ultimate goal.66
Sourcing practitioners often stress the importance of not introducing unnecessary
micro-level analysis that would make a model of strategic sourcing scenarios unwieldy
and overcomplicated. Instead, to make the model applicable for a wide range of sourcing
decisions of varying importance, we will apply a simpler heuristic "rule of thumb"
approach as much as possible.
A key component to ensuring alignment of the model output with the desired goal
is to define the model's objective function unambiguously. There is a wide range of
possible metrics which BCA could use to evaluate strategic sourcing alternatives. Some
examples include: cost, risk, strategic value and opportunities, operational value (e.g.
quality, efficiency, flexibility), financial value (e.g. profit, revenue, return on invested
66 Expectations from a simulation study should be realistic and not overestimated. Some decision makers
think of simulation study as model-building time and cost. Although model building is a critical phase of a
simulation study, it often consumes less time and cost than does experimental design or data collection.
capital); or others (e.g. market share, stability of labor employment, defense/industrial
offsets, consistency, reduction in total suppliers, manufacturing lead time, etc.).
The right metrics provide a common language for communication and focus
employees' attention on what matters most to success. It is the responsibility of company
leadership to clearly define performance measures in order to help achieve organizational
learning and continuous improvement. Good measures are explicitly defined in terms of
owner, unit of measure, collection frequency, data quality, expected value (targets), and
thresholds.67 These measures should monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the
strategic sourcing decisions, and determine the gap between actual and targeted
performance.
As Shapiro (1984) pointed out, supply chains are all too often seen as cost centers
rather than opportunities to create and deliver value. In the last decade, BCA leaders have
tended to emphasize accounting-based cost metrics for sourcing decisions (while
satisfying standards for quality and delivery). This is very much the traditional "classic
view" of supply chain architecting, which has a goal of 'minimizing an objective cost
function given a required service level constraint.'
Figure 17: "Classic" vs. Lean Supply Chain
The "Classic" View The Lean Supply Chain
Focus Minimize Cost Maximize Value
True Costs, Tactical & Strategic Risk +
Accounts Only Obvious, Quantifiable Costs& Short-term "Tactical" Risks Flexibility, Resiliency, &
Responsiveness
4 DOF: # nodes, locations, how to Concurrent Product,
Degrees of
connect them, & intermediate Process andFreedom
stocks in each Supply Chain Engineering
Supply Chain Static Evolves with Market
View
Source: Diaz, 2005.
A problem with the "classic" type of cost focus is that frequently only obvious
costs (such as transportation and inventory costs) are accounted, while other important
67 These dimensions are used by the Balanced Scorecard Institute, a Strategy Management Group Company
(http://www.balancedscorecard.ore).
costs are generally ignored because they are difficult to quantify. Supply chain
breakdowns, diminished barriers to entry, knowledge loss, or diminished trust from
employees over the long term fall into this category. Thus, since minimizing cost does
not always equate to maximizing value, our model instead attempts to maximize value as
an aggregate function of strategic, operational and financial factors, as well as incorporate
relevant risk factors.
5.1. "Current State" Decision Analysis
If our objective is to improve the quality of BCA's sourcing decisions, our
emphasis should be on improving the system. 68 Thus, our analysis of the current state is
focused on understanding the underlying structure of what data is gathered when and by
whom, what analysis is performed on the data to derive useful information, and how this
information is used to make decisions. One aspect of the structure that is important to
understand is the incentive structure which drives the behavior of managers and their
employees. Within many organizations, performance evaluation and other reward
systems are more-or-less related to profitability. Such incentives often influence rational
actors within the system to continuously reduce costs in order to meet stated
organizational expectations or achieve higher accounting-based profit margins.
Based on historical documentation and interview data, the strategic sourcing
decision process as it currently exists in Boeing strongly emphasizes traditional
accounting-based cost factors. Furthermore, evidence indicates that at the detail level
analysts and decision-makers employ a non-standard factor approach to cost, benefit and
risk analysis. To assess what factors are considered, I examined historical documentation
from a sample of three past sourcing decisions-one standard insource-to-outsource work
transfer proposal, one work transfer proposal designed in support of increased market
access (referred to within Boeing as Strategic Work Placement), and one work transfer
proposal designed to fulfill explicit military offset requirements (referred to within
Boeing as Industrial Participation).
68 Using a systems dynamics philosophy, our focus does not attribute the quality of decisions to any
individual or group, but rather the underlying structure of the system.
Figure 18: BCA "Current State" Cost Factors
Case A Case B
Recurring Costs
Material
Labor
Non-Recurring Costs
Fabrication Division
Test Prototypes
Mechanic Knowledge Transfer
Process Engineer Support
Manufacturing Engineer (ME) Support
Supply Chain Analyst (SCA) Support
Tool Fabrication Support
Define Engineering Support
Facilities
Quality
Tooling Support
Shop & other support
Tool Shipping
Technical Support
International Travel
Onsite Support
Tool Fabrication Support
Domestic Travel
MOP Foreign Living (Major Outside Production)
Procurement Quality Assurance (PQA)
M&PT Engineering Support
Engineering Support
Tulsa Impact
X x x
x x x
The figure above depicts some of the many factors that exemplify the variability
which exists regarding non-recurring detailed costs for each case. The documentation
clearly indicates that a different set of costs are considered in each case. Furthermore,
different terminology appears to be used to represent what in actuality may be the same
cost. For example, it is unclear what in Case A constitutes "Technical Support" and
"Onsite Support", versus what in Case B represents "Shop and Other Support".
There are a number of possible reasons which may explain variance in the
documented cost analysis. First, it may be due to different perspectives, levels of
experience, or training of personnel tasked with performing the analysis. Additionally, it
may be due to one or more factors being irrelevant to the particular case. Another
possibility is there may be some hidden agenda on the part of analysts and cost estimators
to exaggerate or understate the true anticipated costs.
It is interesting to note, for example, that Case A represented a work transfer
proposal in support of market access and cost reduction which originated from outside
the manufacturing organization performing the work. As such, it was relatively unpopular
in the minds of these important stakeholders. Conversely, Case C was a work transfer
Case C
proposal which originated from within the very same internal manufacturing unit that was
currently performing the work. Their objective was to outsource the work in question to
free up capacity for newer, more technologically advanced and higher-value work
involving new airplane development. In the end, Case A was ultimately denied, while
Case C was approved.
With respect to strategic sourcing benefits, costs and risks, the less standardized
the decision analysis procedure, the more difficult it is to achieve consistent and objective
results. Furthermore, the more difficult it is for higher-level managers to provide effective
oversight. From a political perspective, we can imagine that unpopular work transfers
may on occasion result in organizational resistance by engineers and analysts
exaggerating costs, while popular work transfer proposals may not include all costs
which are relevant (e.g. travel, onsite support, etc.).
Furthermore, processes in which decisions are based on unclear metrics and
analysis serve to stifle organizational learning and innovation, and often lead to a lack of
confidence in controversial decisions. Some solutions may originate solely based on the
actions of an individual, with localized goal and objectives. While the benefit of less
structured processes are added flexibility and increased ability for individuals to
influence the outcome, such processes have large variation in their perceived quality and
are very difficult to improve.
In examining the factors not directly related to cost, less documentation exists
regarding what was considered and how important these factors were in the ultimate
decision. The figure below shows that quality, delivery, schedule, market access, and
strategic partnerships were not uniformly or explicitly mentioned in each of the three case
examples.
There are a number of reasons why analysts might not document non-cost factors,
such as: a) they were irrelevant to the decision (e.g. quality already established as
sufficient), b) the factors were evaluated and documented elsewhere, or c) the definition
of a factor (or how to effectively evaluate potential suppliers on that dimension) was
unclear. For example, how should the value of a potential strategic partnership be
estimated, or the potential value of market access? These criteria are not only more
vague, they are also less certain than factors related to near-term financial costs.
Ironically, while "soft" factors are more challenging to estimate, they may actually be
more significant in affecting the long-term future state.
Figure 19: BCA "Current State"
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Less apparent emphasis on non-cost factors may also represent insufficient data
available or insufficient resources devoted to gathering necessary data. Since much of the
business case cost analysis is conducted by personnel from the Finance organization, it is
not entirely surprising to find less consideration of other important strategic, operational
and risk factors documented.
In summary, there are a number of challenges associated with improving the
current strategic sourcing process. To begin with, Boeing may want to consider
establishing a more consistent approach, as well as developing a methodology to
explicitly integrate difficult-to-quantify "soft" costs with the more straightforward
accounting-based financial metrics.
Lack of adherence to a standardized detailed process. The current detail
estimation and analysis is ad hoc (or, "for this purpose"), based on a vague
combination of quantitative and qualitative metrics. A standardized detailed
analysis procedure may better ensure the quality of all strategic sourcing
decisions, as well as support organizational learning.
Integration of qualitative and quantitative factors. There are a number of non-
quantifiable "soft" cost and risk factors that are more challenging to estimate than
short-term "hard" financial metrics.
Organizational resistance to change. Based largely on our human nature to strongly
adhere to the status quo rather than have our long-held beliefs proven wrong, in many
organizations there exists a tendency to resist critical analysis and improvement
initiatives. This factor plays a role in organizations unconsciously (or consciously)
avoiding the collection of data that disproves presently held beliefs, and discounting
alternatives which run counter to the organizational inertia. As aptly described by
Sterman (2000, p.33):
Defensive behavior prevents learning by hiding important information
from others, avoiding public testing or important hypotheses, and tacitly
communicating that we are not open to having our mental models
challenged. Defensive routines often yield groupthink, where members of
a group mutually reinforce their current beliefs, suppress dissent, and seal
themselves off from those with different views or possible disconfirming
evidence. Defensive routines ensure that the metal models of team
members remain ill formed, ambiguous, and hidden. Thus learning by
groups can suffer.
Performance evaluation for many managers and employees is based on financial
metrics, which means that even if other non-financial factors are more important to
maximize the overall value of the system, they will likely be discounted or ignored in
favor of accounting-based cost reduction. Over many years, a traditional cost accounting
mentality permeated many legacy organizations, which now leads to resistance of non-
traditional accounting basis for decisions.
Another obstacle preventing evolution toward more accurate and effective
consideration of "true costs" may be the fact that value streams are not well-defined
enough throughout the organization to accurately allocate only unique costs. Therefore,
direct labor-based overhead allocation of many joint costs makes the "true cost" of
specific internal parts or processes impossible to accurately estimate.
5.2. Strategic, Operational, Financial & Risk Analysis Framework
The proposed decision-support model considers twenty-one relevant decision
factors for strategic sourcing, organized into four categories: Strategy, Operations,
Finance, and Risk. For each of the decision factors, a relative expected value (EV) is
assigned on a 10-point scale. In our case examples, an EV of -5 indicates strong
advantage for an domestic internal supplier, 0 = no preference, and +5 indicates a strong
advantage for an offshore outsource supplier.69 Based on the pre-determined importance
of each factor, the assigned percentage is simply multiplied by the expected value and
summed. 70 In this way, the simple weighted average serves to integrate and synthesize
the factors.
It is important to note that while the single numerical output provides support for
one sourcing alternative over another, the number is not intended as sufficient
justification for that choice. Rather, the focus of the model is to offer a clear and
unambiguous representation of the input factors and their relative importance. This tool
should then be useful for decision-makers to clearly recognize and understand the reasons
in favor of each sourcing alternative, as well as the risks and leverage points for
improving the effectiveness. Through establishing a clear record of the critical sourcing
factors and their expected effect, the model also establishes a "snapshot" for later
reflection on what was accurately forecasted versus what was missed, misunderstood, or
inaccurately represented during the decision-making process. Thus, the model should
enable organizational learning and reduce the chances of making the same mistake again.
In order to begin with the most important considerations and counteract the
tendency to emphasize financial accounting factors, the first level of analysis to be
conducted is the strategic analysis, followed by an operational analysis. Only then, if a
69 The model can be used similarly to compare two internal supplier alternatives, two outsource supplier
alternatives, or any other combination.
70 While there are inherent limitations to this methodology, it was chosen based on its simplicity and ease
of use, as compared to more complicated techniques which incorporate probability distributions, Monte
Carlo simulations, etc.
proposed sourcing alternative satisfies these hurdles, should the financial dimension be
considered. 71 The financial analysis should then incorporate the relevant unique costs that
relate to each sourcing alternative. Finally, a detailed risk analysis provides insight into
the most significant risks to the enterprise, in order to develop a risk avoidance and
mitigation plan. The following figure depicts the general structure and order of analysis:
Figure 20: Integrated DSM for Global Sourcing
Macro Tiered Process
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Accounting(Quantitative)
Failure Mode &
Effects Analysis
(Qualitative)
To begin with, our strategic analysis seeks to qualitatively assess the near-term
and long-term benefits, opportunities and costs of two sourcing alternatives. In his paper
titled Moving a Slow-Clockspeed Business into the Fast Lane: Strategic Sourcing
Lessons from Value Chain Redesign in the Automotive Industry, Fine (2001) suggests a
strategic value analysis which involves: a) Customer Importance, b) Technology
Clockspeed, c) Competitive Position, d) Supplier Capability, and e) Architecture.
Building upon his work, I explicitly introduce supplier willingness to integrate, enterprise
knowledge management, and economic contribution within the third, fourth and fifth
dimensions, respectively. Furthermore, I add a sixth dimension titled "Exogenous
Forces," and reorder the steps to align with the value stream construct presented earlier-
71 For example, it is irrelevant that a particular supplier might offer significant cost savings if the proposed
work is core knowledge upon which the firm's competitive advantage lies. Similarly, the cheapest vendor
offering the most cost savings would not be a good alternative if it is unable to meet the minimum quality
and delivery requirements.
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understand the core technology, align the product/process/supply chain architecture, and
deliver measurable value to the customer.
The strategic value analysis, therefore, consists of six components, as detailed
below.
Figure 21: Strategic Value Analysis
When to...
M In-source vs. Outsource
I. Technology Clockspeed. Clockspeed (Fast vs. Slow). How rapidly is the
underlying technology for this product 72 changing? This relates specifically the
rate of technological innovation. Novelty (Innovative vs. Established). How new
is the underlying technology for this product?
II. Product/Process Architecture. Modularity (Integral vs. Modular). How integral
(number of interfaces) or modular is this product to the overall product, service or
system of which it is a component? The more integral the product to the overall
system, the more risky to be fully dependent on an outside supplier. Complexity
(Complex vs. Simple). How complex (number of subcomponents and level of
technology required to produce) is this product? The more complex the product,
the more knowledge necessary to deliver it and the more valuable to insource.
III. Supply Base Characteristics. Capability (None vs. Many). How deep and
capable is the outside supply base for outsourcing this product? The more capable
the supply base (in number of viable suppliers and their technological
72 The term 'product' as I refer to it within the model may also be substituted with 'service.'
Technology Clockspeed Fast Slow
Product/Process Architecture Integral Modular
Supply Base Characteristics None Many
Enterprise Characteristics Advantage Disadvantage
Customer Value High Margin Low Margin
Exogenous Forces Weak Strong
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competency) the safer to outsource. In addition to supplier physical and resource
capacity, this factor should include management capability, information systems,
historical performance, qualifications, as well as any regulatory constraints.
Supplier Power (Strong vs. Weak). How strong is the supplier position for this
product? How likely is the chance of supplier hold-up? 73 Supplier Integration
(Close vs. Far). How willing and able is the supplier to tie in closely with us, their
customer? This relates to general supplier philosophy toward relationships and
process improvement, as well as willingness to work closely together and co-
locate facilities when appropriate. 74
IV. Enterprise Characteristics. Enterprise Knowledge (Core vs. Peripheral). How
core is the knowledge relating to the product to the current or future success of the
business? Competitive Position (Advantage, Disadvantage). How capable is the
firm relative to its competition in achieving cost, quality, delivery, etc. for this
product? This factor should include consideration of core competencies,
proprietary technologies, intellectual property, and enterprise value stream
alignment.
V. Customer Value. Economic Contribution (High Margin vs. Low Margin). How
valuable is this product to the customer? The more valuable, the more desirable to
keep in house. A quantifiable metric which may be used to represent the value
customers apply to a product is economic contribution.75 This metric depicts the
fraction of unit revenue which contributes to offsetting fixed costs, which is a
useful measure of the value to the firm for each unit produced internally.
73 Consideration of supplier hold-up should include labor unions as a source of labor input, and the
potential for strikes or other collective bargaining issues.
As a foundation of Porter's Cluster Theory, geographic co-location is a key factor related to successful
integration of material and labor inputs, knowledge sharing and innovation, and effective customer
feedback loops.75 Within managerial accounting practice, economic contribution is defined as the unit revenue (market
price) minus unit variable cost (i.e. the marginal profit per unit sale).
Customer Preference (Important vs. Unimportant). How does the sourcing option
affect customer preferences?7 6
VI. Exogenous Forces. Foreign Market Access (Low vs. High). How valuable is the
anticipated direct impact of the sourcing alternative on foreign market
opportunities? The stronger the foreign market forces relative to the domestic
forces, the more desirable it is to offshore and/or outsource products. Political
Forces (Weak vs. Strong). How strong are foreign or domestic political forces in
relation to alternative sourcing options? This should include consideration of
existing and anticipated defense and commercial offset obligations.
For the second phase of our analysis, we begin the operational value assessment
by determining the demand forecast accuracy. (Note that this factor is independent of the
sourcing alternatives being considered.) The two sourcing alternatives are then compared
against each other and assigned a relative value along each of four key operational
dimensions (Velocity, Quality, Delivery and Capacity).
Figure 22: Operational Value Analysis
When to...UMe In-source vs. Outsource
VH. Demand Forecast Accuracy. (Variable vs. Stable). How close is the actual
product demand to the forecasted quantity? The more variable the demand signal
76 Fine (1998) suggests that the more important the source to the consumer, the more important the sourcing
decision. However, in light of high customer satisfaction with companies such as Apple who outsource all
production, perhaps customers consider the who unimportant if their expectation of quality is satisfied.
Demand Forecast Accuracy Variable Stable
Velocity Fast Slow
Quality Essential Non-essential
Delivery Essential Flexible
Capacity Available Unavailable
(Internal) (Internal)
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and inaccurate the forecast, the more desirable it is to source locally and/or
insource. This is because delays within the system combined with inaccurate
forecasts (often due to unpredictable variable demand signals) will result in
greater inventory holding costs necessary to achieve a requisite service level (due
to the "bullwhip effect"). It is often valuable, therefore, to maintain short shipping
lead times to reduce delays in the system.
The variable commonly used to measure demand forecast accuracy is
Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE), which is the average of the absolute
percentage differences between the actual and forecasted demand data.
SForecast, 
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VIII. Velocity. (Fast vs. Slow). How fast does (or would) the product flow through the
supply chain? Commonly measured using its inverse, 'dock-to-dock time,' it is
defined as the time from when the oldest component and/or raw material (often
based on date stamp) arrives at the factory until the completed (sub)assembly
arrives at the next downstream customer. Note that this includes time for shipping
to the downstream customer. Dock-to-dock time is typically calculated as:
RM + WIP + FGDock - to - Dock Time =
ASR
where
RM = raw materials inventory ($)
WIP = work in process inventory ($)
FG = finished goods inventory ($)
ASR = average shipping rate ($/timeperiod)
IX. Quality. (Essential vs. Non-essential). How important is quality for this product?
The more essential quality is for this product, the more risky it is to be dependant
upon an unproven supplier. Defined and measured as 'defective parts per million'
(DPPM), this factor can first serve as a screening criteria to ensure unqualified
suppliers are identified. Frequently, the quality standard will be met by either
alternative, however in some instances this is not the case. 77
This factor can also be useful to incorporate anticipated cost of quality
differences between the two sourcing alternatives. In those circumstances, the
quality factor should relate the effects of lower quality and new supplier learning
curves, if possible through direct cost estimates for helping a supplier attain the
necessary standard.
X. Delivery. (Essential vs. Flexible). How important is delivery of this product,
measured as 'percent of shipments delivered on or before due date'? The more
essential on-time delivery is for this product, the better it is to co-locate the
supplier with the customer. Like quality, this factor can serve as a screening
criteria, since delivery is an important element within lean production systems
which require low-inventory and consistent just-in-time delivery.78
XI. Capacity. (Available vs. Unavailable). How sufficient is the supplier's current
available capacity, measured as 'percentage utilization of key resource
constraint(s)'? The fixed cost associated with using excess internal capacity is
effectively zero. Thus, this element relates to the cost and time estimated to
develop new capacity, and the potential value of additional capacity for future
production flexibility.
For the third phase of our analysis, the financial value is specifically intended as a
high-level presentation of the relevant financial costs to the organization, for the purpose
of decision-making. Due to the weaknesses inherent to allocation-based costing, this
analysis incorporates only direct production costs (not burdened by overhead). It also
77 As an extreme example, interviews with Boeing employees depicted lack of quality on the part of a new
offset-related supplier to result in wholesale scrapping of large quantities of parts.
78 Although contrary to 'lean principles', the delivery standard can usually be met by any supplier willing to
incur holding costs for locally-warehoused finished goods inventory. While not immediately charged as a
direct cost to their customer, there is "no free lunch." Eventually, excess inventory held anywhere within
the value chain will ultimately result in added cost to the consumer and should be eliminated.
seeks to more explicitly estimate transaction costs as part of supplier management costs.
Furthermore, by taking a more holistic perspective incorporating indirect lifecycle costs
potentially incurred by other value stream stakeholders, the intent is to recognize how a
sourcing alternative may impact the costs to other members within the value stream. Note
that for all of the financial factors listed below, the lower the relative cost of either
supplier, the more desirable it is compared to the other.
Figure 23: Financial Value Analysis
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When to...
In-source vs. Outsource
XII. Production Cost per Unit. The sum of all direct recurring material and labor
costs divided by the number of units. When data is available, forecasts may be
adjusted to account for wage growth rate, labor productivity, and learning curve
effects.
XIII. Transportation / Logistics Cost. The sum of all recurring79 costs for movement
and storage of material inputs and finished goods, including: transportation,
receiving, inspection, inventory holding (both capital charges and warehousing
costs), insurance, etc.
XIV. Investment Cost. The sum of all non-recurring costs related to a sourcing
alternative. This includes infrastructure development, supplier selection and
negotiation, tooling, manufacturing, facilities (PP&E), labor recruitment and
79 Note: any non-recurring transportation or logistics infrastructure development costs should be
incorporated into 'investment cost'.
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training, information technology (IT) and computing, transition support team
assistance (from supplier management, engineering, tooling, manufacturing, and
other organizations), impact of residual supply from previous supplier, etc.
XV. Supplier Management Cost. The sum of all recurring costs for managing
supplier relationships, including: supplier communication (phone calls, faxes, and
video conferences for meetings, forecast updates, performance reviews, etc.),
company support personnel working at the supplier location, local hires, recurring
supplier training and technical support, quality assurance audits, cooperation with
supplier for engineering changes and innovation, renegotiation, etc.
XVI. Tax Impact. The sum of all government-related costs and incentives, including:
tax and duties (including credits), job training subsidies, other state or federal aid
(cost mitigation), discount term, benefit from payment term changes, etc. This
factor may be either positive or negative, depending on the location and potential
incentives offered.
XVII. ALifecycle Cost. How do cost factors interact and accumulate among the relevant
stakeholders during the different life cycle stages?
As the last component of the model, the detailed risk analysis is subdivided into
four categories: supply/dependency risk, enterprise system breakdown, demand
uncertainty, and uncontrollable risk. The first three encompass all controllable risks that
are endogenous to the value chain, while the fourth considers uncontrollable risks that
exist due to changes in the external environment. All four of these broad categories are
first considered from the point of view of the firm.
Figure 24: Risk Analysis Framework
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This model suggests an approach to risk analysis for strategic sourcing that does
not mandate a quantified basis for all potential risks, since the level of complexity and
uncertainty can lead to unwarranted confidence in the estimate. For example, rather than
trying to estimate the accurate probability that Russia will experience a dramatic political
shift and nationalize Boeing's investment in the country, we should instead focus on
recognizing if the risk exists and developing an effective mitigation plan based on the
relative significance of the risk (as determined via FMEA analysis Risk Priority
Number). People usually recognize that a qualitative estimate is basically a guess, and are
therefore more likely to keep it in the appropriate mind frame.
There are, however, factors which particularly lend themselves to data-driven
estimation (such as production or transportation/logistics costs) and risk analysis (such as
the probability of earthquakes in a given location based on Bayesian inference modelss ).
This is because, while some factor outcomes may be random, there is sufficient data upon
which to statistically base an estimate.
XVIII. Supply Risk. This category includes any controllable risk which could result in
overdependence on suppliers, delays, disruptions, or increased costs of supplier
inputs. These can include: knowledge dependence, supplier upstream vertical
so Bayesian inference is statistical inference in which evidence or observations are used to update or to
newly infer the probability that a hypothesis may be true. The name "Bayesian" comes from the frequent
use of Bayes" theorem in the inference process.
integration, supplier labor disputes, deliberate underperformance (or "shirking"),
opportunistic renegotiation (or "assertion"), moral hazard, capacity dependence,
poor quality/rework/scrap, inadequate capability or misrepresentation, supplier
inflexibility, single source dependency, inventory holding, logistics and
transportation, supplier bankruptcy, etc.
Additionally, risks from the perspective of the supply base should also be
recognized, to include relationship-specific investment, winners curse/bid too
high, etc.
XIX. Enterprise System Risk. Risks associated with the enterprise systems are
represented within this category. These include: internal labor disputes,
intellectual property breaches (or "poaching"), Information Technology systems
breakdown, etc.
XX. Demand Risk. This category incorporates any risks from the demand side.
Specifically, this may include: inaccurate demand forecast, customer bankruptcy,
etc.
XXI. Uncontrollable Risk. Lastly, this category encompasses all uncontrollable risks.
These can include: natural disasters, acts of war or terrorism, legislation or
regulation, financial recession, transportation capacity and pricing, raw materials
availability and pricing, exchange rate fluctuation, industry-wide capacity, etc.
In order to test the proposed model's validity and usability, we will now compare
and contrast two examples of Boeing global sourcing decisions as illustrative case
studies.
5.3. Application of the Model
In the first example, production of 737 vertical fins, Boeing has chosen offshore
outsourcing from two different suppliers. However, for 777 vertical fins, Boeing decided
to locally insource production at the Boeing Fabrication division. What factors may have
driven the decision to use two very different sourcing strategies for the vertical fins on
these two airplane programs? Are there other considerations which decision-makers
should consider in the future? To begin with, we will define what a vertical fin is, and
how the two different vertical fins compare.
A vertical fin assembly (a.k.a. "vertical stabilizer" or "vertical tail") is an
elliptical airfoil comprised of the leading edge, center box, trailing edge and rudder. It is
most commonly a part of the aft end of the fuselage, and points straight upward. The
function of the vertical fin flight control surface is the same for both airplanes-to control
yaw (i.e. side-to-side horizontal movement) of the airplane while in flight. For both
airplane programs exactly one standard vertical fin is required, which means the vertical
fin demand forecast is closely correlated to the airplane demand forecast.
Figure 25: Vertical Fin
Source: Boeing.com
Beyond these general similarities, there are a number of important differences
between the vertical fins for the respective programs, some of which are crucial to
understand and consider when selecting an appropriate sourcing strategy. As we will see
by contrasting these two examples, material / process technology, enterprise knowledge
management, foreign market access, and defense offset obligations justify different
choices for global sourcing.
0
5.4. 777 Case Study: Local Internal Sourcing
The Boeing 777 vertical fin is comprised of Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastics
(Fawcett, Trostle, & Ward, 1997), which makes it more technologically advanced than
the aluminum 737 vertical fin currently in production. Back in the early 1980s, Boeing
first developed its knowledge for manufacturing and testing composite flight control
surfaces through a joint NASA/Boeing research program for manufacturing composite
empennage (vertical fin, horizontal stabilizer, elevator and rudder) components. 81
Building on this knowledge, Boeing implemented a company-funded program to
construct a 777 prototype/pre-production horizontal stabilizer out of composite materials.
The design was based on the 767 design, which engineers adjusted accordingly to achieve
the 777 scale while using composite materials (Fawcett et al., 1997). The use of CFRP on
the 777 program has since enabled Boeing to continue to develop advanced composite
technology for use on subsequent commercial airplane programs such as the new 787
Dreamliner.82
Figure 26: Composite Material on the 777
Source NASA 2003
Through the proposed decision support model framework, we can now explore
what characteristics of the 777 vertical fin are relevant to consider when deciding where
to source it. As described earlier, I evaluated all factors on a 10-point scale from -5 to +5.
81 Ironically, the NASA/Boeing 737 horizontal stabilizer still being manufactured out of aluminum was
actually the first major component of composite structure certified for commercial use (McCarty, Johnson
& Wilson, 1982). Boeing introduced five shipsets of the composite 737 parts into service in 1984.
82 Carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP) is the primary composite for the majority of the new Boeing 787
Dreamliner's structure, with titanium graphite composites also integrated into the wings (Walz, 2007).Dreamliner's structure, with titanium graphite composites also integrated into the wings (Walz, 2007).
I assigned expected values myself to merely demonstrate application of the model, with
relative weightings based on senior leader priorities as expressed in interviews.
The application of the model toward the case examples is strictly to illustrate how
the model would function to support standardization, unambiguous communication of
factor weightings among stakeholders, and documentation of relative sourcing
advantages or disadvantages. Thus, there may be legitimate arguments that one or more
of the factor weightings or relative advantages should be adjusted-this type of structured
interaction to consider all relevant factors, through deliberation among a cross-functional
team of stakeholder representatives, may be one of the best ways to achieve a high
quality decision outcome.
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As shown in the summary analysis, the weighted average of the twenty-one
factors I considered equals -1.4. As a negative number, the output supports the local
insourcing alternative as the more effective strategy for 777 vertical fins (compared to an
offshore outsource supplier). This result is based primarily on aspects of knowledge
management which relate to three factors: technology clockspeed, supply base
characteristics, and enterprise characteristics. Furthermore, based on these factors, the
justification for insourcing is especially strong during the early stages of composite wing
technology development.
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The model's structure incorporates some relative benefit for geographic
proximity, based on greater velocity, and reduced cost of transportation and logistics for a
co-located supplier (especially for large structures). Additionally, there is some benefit
attributable to reduced supply risk and enterprise breakdown. Since the output is not -3 or
less, its relative position along the sourcing spectrum further suggests that once the
technology becomes more established and supplier capability improves, at some point an
alliance or joint venture may be appropriate.
I. Technology Clockspeed: (Score: -5 strongly supports local insourcing)
Clockspeed. The underlying technology for composite aero structures is still
quickly evolving as firms apply composite materials and process technology in
ever increasing percentages to new airplane programs. The unprecedented use of
composites for the 787 and A380 shows the importance of this technology to the
industry, and finding ways to decrease manufacturing lead time and reduce costs
will remain a priority. Furthermore, potential advances may exist for significantly
improving the manufacturing processes for composite airplane structures, which
Boeing may benefit from investing in itself. Technology novelty. The underlying
technology for small composite material structures is not particularly new or
complicated. For example, light sport aircraft manufacturers are able to construct
small composite aircraft in their garage with simple and inexpensive tooling.
However, the capability to produce large-scale composite aero structures is very
new. One example of this would be Boeing's cutting-edge technology for the 787
which offers protection against lightning strikes-a new proprietary design
feature.
II. Product/Process Architecture: (Score: 0 indicates equal advantage)
Modularity. Compared to the 737 aluminum structure, the 777 composite vertical
fin interfaces with the overall airplane in much the same way. In both cases the
interfaces are well-defined. Complexity. The process complexity of the 777
vertical fin is greater because it involves more precise tolerance for the
manufacturing environment and employs automated composite lay-up technology.
Conversely, the 737 aluminum manufacturing process is more established process
technology and therefore less complex.83
III. Supply Base Characteristics: (Score: -3 supports local insourcing)
Capability. An outside supply base for outsourcing large-scale composite aero
structures did not exist in the early 1980's when BCA first developed the
capability. While still relatively small, the number of suppliers with such
capability is growing-as evidenced by an external supplier chosen to
manufacture the composite wing for the 787. Supplier Power. Through use of an
internal supplier, there are no issues related to supplier power. Conversely, given
the limited supply base, a sole source contract would involve accepting the risk of
supplier holdup. Downstream relationships. BCA Fabrication division is very
willing and able to tie in closely with their customer. Boeing's Composite
Manufacturing Center (CMC) in Auburn is located within ninety minutes of final
assembly in Everett, Washington.
IV. Enterprise Characteristics: (Score: -4 strongly supports local insourcing)
Enterprise Knowledge. The development and maintenance of composite
manufacturing technology is greatly reinforced by sourcing internally.
Competitive Position. BCA is among the best in the world in achieving cost,
quality, delivery, etc. for designing and producing large-scale composite aero
structures.
V. Customer Value: (Score: -1 mildly supports local insourcing)
Customer Preference. Quality-assured flight control surfaces are very important
to customers, particularly at the time when CFRP use in aero structures was a
nascent technology. Boeing in-house design and production of composite vertical
fins offered customers a greater sense of confidence in the quality and safety of
the product. Economic Contribution. The reduction in weight associated with the
83 Another interesting question indirectly related, is what knowledge of the detailed automated composite
process tooling technology is actually within the firm and what is provided by a tooling supplier?
composite vertical fins (versus the previous aluminum structure) results in a
corresponding increased willingness of customers to pay a premium price. The
market price minus the direct material and labor cost for a composite 777 vertical
fin is therefore greater than if it were aluminum. Hence, the economic
contribution of the composite vertical fin is more valuable to the enterprise than
the 737 vertical fin.
VI. Exogenous Forces: (Score: 0 indicates equal advantage)
Foreign Market Access. At the time when the sourcing decision was made, no
foreign market forces appeared to factor in to the decision. Political Forces. No
defense offset obligations were sought to be met through outsourcing of the 777
vertical fins. On the contrary, domestic labor relations were strengthened by
investing internally in the capability and knowledge of BCA Fabrication through
establishment of the CMC center of excellence for composite manufacturing
technology.
VII. Demand Forecast Accuracy: (Score: 5 strongly supports offshore
outsourcing) Demand forecast accuracy is very high, since there is only one
model of fin and one vertical fin goes on each respective airplane.
VIII. Velocity: (Score: -4 strongly supports local insourcing)
Assuming roughly equivalent manufacturing lead time, the velocity of sourcing
from a local supplier is significantly faster, since shipping lead time must be
added to an offshore outsource supplier's dock-to-dock time. This would add
approximately 40 days to the total lead time if the 777 vertical fin was
manufactured, for example, in the Far East.
IX. Quality: (Score: -1 mildly supports local insourcing)
Measured as defective parts per million (DPPM). The quality of the internal
Composite Manufacturing Center is world-class, and easier to control through an
internal supplier organization.
X. Delivery: (Score: -1 mildly supports local insourcing)
Delivery is consistently near 100% due in part to the geographic proximity as well
as effective management of a just-in-time delivery system.
XI. Capacity: (Score: 3 supports offshore outsourcing)
The CMC facility in Auburn, Wash. as it currently exists is operating at a very
high level of capacity utilization since being tasked to produce the 787
Dreamliner vertical fins as well as the 777 vertical fins. Thus, on this dimension
the cost of additional capacity could involve large fixed costs and lead time
related to construction of an expanded facility.
XII. Production Cost per Unit: (Score: 1 mildly supports offshore outsourcing)
Sourcing from a lower cost labor regions would result in some variable cost
reduction, and therefore make offshoring an appealing alternative. Due to the high
level of automation in the composite manufacturing process as currently designed,
however, the variable production cost per unit is largely a function of materials
cost. Thus, any cost advantage related to labor rate savings would be a relatively
small percentage of the total variable production cost.
XIII. Transportation/ Logistics Cost: (Score: -3 supports local insourcing)
The geographic proximity between Auburn and Everett, Wash. results in very low
costs for transportation, inventory holding, and insurance. There was no
requirement for non-recurring investment in infrastructure to support the
transportation.
XIV. Investment Cost: (Score: 2 supports offshore outsourcing)
There were significant investment costs required for Boeing to develop the CMC
production capacity for the vertical fins, including direct tooling and facility
construction. These costs would not be incurred if the decision were to outsource.
XV. Supplier Management Cost (Score: -2 supports local insourcing)
Based on interviews with 777 empennage line managers, a very good internal
supplier relationship is facilitated mainly through periodic meetings and phone
calls. The level of cooperation between the CMC and downstream internal
customer is very close and results in outstanding communication across
organizations. When changes are needed, the level of responsiveness was
described as excellent.
XVI. Tax Impact: (Score: 3 supports offshore outsourcing)
Various incentives would likely be available from foreign governments as an
incentive to locate production there.
XVII. ALifecycle Cost: (Score: 0 indicates equal advantage). Unknown.
XVIII. Supply Risk: (Score: -4 strongly supports local insourcing)
Some risk of union labor striking does exist. However, this would have marginal
impact if final production was equally affected. More significant risk of limited
internal capacity, which could result in delays if rates increase significantly.
XIX. Enterprise System Risk: (Score: -4 strongly supports local insourcing)
Very low risk of breakdown for Information Technology systems and Intellectual
Property controls, due to commonality of systems and secure intra-firm
relationship.
XX. Demand Risk: (Score: 0 indicates equal advantage)
Not applicable, since this relates to customer risks which are identical for both
alternatives.
XXI. Uncontrollable Risk: (Score: -3 supports local insourcing)
Some risk of natural disasters such as earthquake in the Puget Sound region.
Additionally, there is risk of financial recession and exchange rate fluctuation
based on US currency exposure.
5.5. 737 Case Study: Offshore Outsourcing
The Boeing 737 vertical fin is made of aluminum, similar in process to the way
airplanes have been built since WWII, and comparatively less advanced than composite
777 vertical fin technology. Over the last twenty years, Boeing has increased the
percentage offshore outsourcing of 737 vertical fins from 0 to 100%, with incremental
decisions to increase outsourcing made in 1989, 1995, and 2003.84 This increase has
resulted partly from expanding military offset requirements by many foreign
governments, and also from pressure by foreign governments to offer work to their
national aerospace industry indirectly.
Boeing and other commercial airplane makers typically use work placement (in
Boeing this is referred to as "strategic work placement" to help develop foreign markets
for airplanes, develop sources of production, and motivate future sales. World Trade
Organization rules mandate that this strategic work placement is not a condition of sale,
so strategic work placement is used to support longer-range strategic objectives.
In 1988-89, Boeing began sourcing empennage components from China when it
awarded Xi'an Aircraft Company (XAC) a contract to produce Boeing 737 Classic
vertical fins and horizontal stabilizers. The following year, China placed one of the
largest commercial aircraft orders in Boeing history: 36 airplanes and 36 options resulting
in a purchase totaling $9 billion.
In 1995, with the introduction of the 737 Next Generation (NG), Boeing
contracted with XAC and Shanghai Aviation Industrial Corporation (SAIC) to supply
vertical fins and horizontal stabilizers, respectively. This strategic decision allocated
some 737 empennage work between two different suppliers and countries while
84 As of 2007, all 737 vertical fins and horizontal stabilizers are sourced from China and Korea.
85 Strategic Work Placement also includes placing work in order to access strategic technological
capability, such as engineering work done at Boeing's Moscow Design Center.
maintaining a percentage of the work internally at Boeing's Wichita facility (now Spirit
AeroSystems), to effectively mitigate some risks inherent in sole sourcing and offshoring.
Figure 28: China's Role on the 737
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As noted by some Boeing employees, the first one hundred ship-sets within any
airplane program are typically when significant challenges are encountered, along with
significant learning and improvement. Thus, after the first couple years a very stable
system is normally established and the level of problems diminishes to a point that
supplier capability (whether internal or outsource) becomes very good. In the case of the
737 vertical fin, after nearly a decade XAC was very capable as a consistent and quality-
assured supplier, having delivered its 1000t 737 vertical fin to Boeing in 2004.86
In 2002, Commercial Airplanes agreed to help Boeing IDS by fulfilling an offset
obligation related to the sale of 40 F-15K aircraft to Korea. 87 In exchange for offset
credits, Boeing announced in late 2003 that production of vertical fins and horizontal
stabilizers would be outsourced to Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI). Consequently,
Boeing decided at that time to completely phase out production of these parts in Wichita.
By mid-2005, Boeing announced its decision to also substantially increase 737
86 From http://www.boeingchina.com/en/aboutboeinj/chronology.shtml.
87 The $3.3B value of the Boeing-South Korea F-15K offset agreement amounted to roughly 70% of the
total $4.4B sale (Wayne, 2003). Of this $3.3B, approximately $1.3B (40%) involved 11 parts contracts
such as for commercial airplane parts (Blue Sky Management Consultants, 2004).
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component production rates at XAC and SAIC for the vertical fin and horizontal
stabilizer. Since 2007, vertical fins and horizontal stabilizers are no longer manufactured
in Wichita.
By applying the decision support model framework, we can explore what
characteristics of the 737 vertical fin should be considered when deciding where to
source it.
Figure 29: 737
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As indicated in the summary analysis, the weighted average of the sample of
factor inputs I considered is +1.63. As a positive number, the output supports offshore
outsourcing as an effective strategy for 737 vertical fins (compared to local insourcing).
This result is based primarily on exogenous forces, sufficient supply base capacity and
capability, and more mature technology. This output also suggests a supplier-managed
inventory strategy, which Boeing already has in place.
What the model does not calculate, however, is the relative advantages of offshore
insourcing or local outsourcing. The model output indicates additional benefits may be
recognized through a decrease in transportation/logistics cost, decreased dock-to-dock
time, and decreased supplier management cost. Based on potential advantages of both of
the other alternatives in achieving these benefits, there may have been a stronger
justification for one or both of these alternatives compared to offshore outsourcing.
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I. Technology Clockspeed: (Score: 4 strongly supports offshore outsourcing)
Clockspeed. The underlying technology for aluminum aero structures is well
established, and the rate of innovation is slow. This makes the 737 vertical fin a
good candidate for outsourcing.
II. Product/Process Architecture: (Score: 0 indicates equal advantage)
Modularity. As in the case of the 777, the 737 vertical fin interfaces with the
overall airplane in much the same way. However, due to a lack of modularity in
the product design some opportunity for improvement still exists.88 Flexibility.
Being more manual and involving more standard tooling, this process is more
flexible than the automated CFRP process. Complexity. The process complexity
of the 737 vertical fin is in some ways less than the 777 because it involves less
precise tolerance for the manufacturing environment and does not involve
similarly automated technologies.
III. Supply Base Characteristics: (Score: 3 supports offshore outsourcing)
Capability. A number of outside suppliers exist with the capability to manufacture
aluminum aero structures. Supplier Power. There are some potential aspects of
supplier hold-up which are mitigated by dual-sourcing. Downstream
relationships. External suppliers have been very responsive to the needs of their
customer, even if located halfway around the world.
IV. Enterprise Characteristics: (Score: 1 mildly supports offshore outsourcing)
Enterprise Knowledge. Boeing has a deep base of aluminum manufacturing
knowledge. Competitive Position. As more suppliers have become capable of
performing aluminum aero manufacturing work, Boeing has found it increasingly
difficult to remain cost competitive.
88 Based on the product design, the 737 vertical fins are not entirely modular. That is, each vertical fin is
manufactured in a way that it must be married up with a particular airplane line number. If a 737 vertical
fin is damaged in transit, it requires significant additional transaction costs to be incurred for reallocating
the ship-sets.
V. Customer Value: (Score: -1 mildly supports local insourcing)
Customer Preference. Given the more established technology, customers are
satisfied with Boeing supplier certification that necessary standards for quality
and safety of the product are achieved. Economic Contribution. The market price
minus the direct material and labor cost for aluminum 737 vertical fins is not as
great as if it were lighter composites, or part of a larger capacity airplane
structure. Hence, the economic contribution of the aluminum vertical fin is
relatively less valuable to the enterprise than the composite 777 fins.
VI. Exogenous Forces: (Score: 5 strongly supports offshore outsourcing)
Foreign Market Access. At the time when the sourcing decision was made,
support for sales of airplanes to China factored significantly into the decision.
Political Forces. Satisfaction of Boeing IDS military offset commitments was
another important benefit recognized by production in Korea.
VII. Demand Forecast Accuracy: (Score: 5 strongly supports offshore
outsourcing) The comparatively stable demand signal involves a less dramatic
"bullwhip" effect than many other parts and services.
VIII. Velocity: (Score: -1 mildly supports local insourcing)
The velocity is negatively impacted by long shipping lead times.
IX. Quality: (Score: 4 strongly support offshore outsourcing)
The quality was a more significant challenge within the first 100 shipsets, but the
supplier learning curve effect resulted in no negative impact on quality.
X. Delivery: (Score: 4 strongly supports offshore outsourcing)
Delivery is in effect 100% satisfied through early shipment of vertical fins to a
local supplier warehouse, where the fins are held until required for installation.
XI. Capacity: (Score: 5 strongly supports offshore outsourcing)
The cost and time to develop new capacity is an advantage of employing two
offshore suppliers with support of their respective governments for developing
capacity. Very flexible.
XII. Production Cost per Unit: (Score: 4 strongly supports offshore outsourcing)
Lower labor costs make this an advantage for offshore suppliers.
XIII. Transportation / Logistics Cost: (Score: -3 supports local insourcing)
Significantly added cost of transportation and logistics. While mainly recurring
costs, may also involve non-recurring infrastructure development costs.
XIV. Investment Cost: (Score: -4 strongly supports local insourcing)
Supplier selection and negotiation were quite extensive. Significant costs related
to transition support team involved with getting new suppliers capability .up to
requisite levels.
XV. Supplier Management Cost: (Score: -1 mildly supports local insourcing)
Significant costs incurred to sustain Boeing support personnel working abroad.
Renegotiation has been an issue when changes are requested.
XVI. Tax Impact: (Score: 3 supports offshore outsourcing)
Although tariffs are higher with offshore alternative, they are more than
compensated for by foreign government incentives.
XVI. ALifecycle Cost: (Score: 0 indicates equal advantage) Unknown.
XVIII. Supply Risk: (Score: 1 mildly supports offshore outsourcing)
Higher risk of poor quality, rework, and scrap within first 100 ship-sets;
opportunistic renegotiation (or "assertion"), knowledge dependence, supplier
upstream vertical integration, supplier labor disputes, deliberate
underperformance (or "shirking"), capacity dependence, inadequate capability or
misrepresentation, supplier inflexibility, inventory holding, logistics and
transportation, supplier bankruptcy, etc.
XXII. Enterprise System Risk: (Score: -1 mildly supports local insourcing)
Greater relative risk associated with intellectual property breaches (or
"poaching"), Information Technology systems breakdown, etc. with offshore
suppliers.
XXIII. Demand Risk: (Score: 0 indicates equal advantage) Not applicable.
XXIV. Uncontrollable Risk: (Score: -2 mildly supports local insourcing)
Greater risk of increased oil prices causing transportation costs to increase over
time for offshore alternatives; also, potentially greater risk of political instability
and exchange rate inflation.
5.6. Additional Considerations: Lessons from the 787 Dreamliner
... in the real world of irreversible actions and high stakes the need to
maintain performance often overrides the need to learn by suppressing
new strategies for fear they would cause present harm even though they
might yield great insight and prevent future harm (Sterman, 2000, p. 33).
Purchasing magazine named Steven Schaffer its Supply Chain Manager of the
Year in 2007, "For his keen insight into supplier-relationship management, his
achievements on the 787 program so far, and for his success in revamping the whole
supplier-relationship process at Boeing" (Avery, 2007). Since then, a number of
challenges have arisen from the 787 global sourcing strategy, due to various unplanned
disruptions within the system. Boeing now has an opportunity to learn valuable lessons
from their ongoing experience, and help ensure more informed decisions for the future.
In January 2006, less than nine months prior to the first announcement of delays
of the 787 program, Schaffer and his team had reported they were more than satisfied
with performance of BCA's suppliers. "Our performance shows that deliveries and
revenues are increasing... And, we continue to increase our margins, which is a sign of
productivity throughout the whole value chain," said Schaffer (Avery, 2006).89 Over
time, however, the problems associated with the supply chain strategy have become
undeniable.
In August 2007, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to spend a few days with
general managers, manufacturing engineers, industrial engineers, and others on the 787
factory floor. What struck me most was a large amount of 'traveled work.' 90 If in theory
a perfectly lean enterprise would rely on strictly "pull" processing and perfect first-time
quality (which is, by definition, no traveled work), reality proved inconsistent with that
ideal. One explanation might be that a schedule-driven demand for large amounts of
traveled work had introduced a new layer of complexity and wasteful activity into the
production system. As this traveled work began to pile up, it served to exacerbate the
89 Note: Higher margins do not necessarily equal higher total profit, nor long-term health for the business.
90 Boeing uses the term 'traveled work' to describe incomplete activities designed to be performed by an
upstream actor passed on downstream customer, where they will require additional work for completion.
challenges associated with an already ambitious flow time and production ramp-up
schedule.
Example: A particular supplier process may require attachment of many
brackets onto a particular subassembly. With over one thousand bracket
needing to be installed, a supplier may for any number of reasons (such as
adherence to a production schedule) stop short of task completion and
leave hundreds of brackets still unattached. The supplier then "travels" the
incomplete subassembly and remaining brackets on to final assembly-not
across the factory, but across the ocean.
Since the electronic work statement does not indicate the
percentage of brackets already installed-but does indicate the number of
brackets shipped-it appears to the final assembly personnel that the
supplier provided insufficient brackets (missing the number already
installed).
Therefore, the work package will sit idle and will not be released
to a final assembly mechanic for completion because the information
technology system does is not designed to show that the missing XXX
brackets are actually already attached.
In an April 9, 2008 news release, Boeing stated that the 787 "first flight is being
rescheduled due to slower than expected completion of work that traveled from supplier
facilities into Boeing's final assembly line, unanticipated rework, and the addition of
margin into the testing schedule" (Boeing, 2008).
The 787 Dreamliner production system was designed for a 3-day final assembly
process flow. While seemingly "lean" with respect to assembly flow time, other value
chain partners were expected to complete some of the value-added work previously
designed to be accomplished during final assembly.
In the early summer of 2007, Boeing learned that there was a shortage of
aerospace-grade fasteners for the new 787 Dreamliner and that a significant amount of
unfinished work was being passed on by suppliers. Boeing has since delayed the 787
delivery schedule three times, making it about eighteen months behind schedule.
Furthermore, BCA has implemented measures to improve the supply chain, such as
recently acquiring Vought Aircraft Industries' stake in Global Aeronautica LLC, a 787
fuselage sub-assembly facility in South Carolina.
After being reassigned, Boeing's former 787 program leader, Mike Bair,
suggested that in the future the company wouldn't rely on such a far-flung supply chain
in building its next jet (Dunlop, 2008). With partners located in Kansas and South
Carolina, Japan and Italy, Boeing has required a fleet of modified 747 freighters just to
ferry assemblies back and forth. Bair also noted Boeing likely wouldn't use some of its
787 suppliers again, but declined to name which ones.
In Chapter 5, we examined the "current state" analysis of BCA's strategic
sourcing decision process, along with a proposed decision-support model designed to
help the company make more consistent, clearly documented, and ever-more informed
strategic sourcing decisions. Finally, Chapter 6 will offer an overall summary, a list of
findings and recommendations, and recommended areas for further study.
6.0 SUMMARY, FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Improving the strategic sourcing process within a firm requires us to first
understand the structure of the system that drives sourcing decisions and the effects of
specific actions on system performance. Boeing's global sourcing system is extremely
complex-it is in continuously evolving, and some sourcing actions yield irreversible
consequences. Furthermore, long time delays between most BCA strategic sourcing
actions and their effects on the state of the system result in historical decision contexts
very different from the current situation through which we view their effects. As such, it
is extremely difficult for the organization to accumulate experience, test hypotheses, and
improve.
The model presented in this work is intended as a holistic approach toward
strategic sourcing decision-making, seeking to incorporate the effects of strategic
sourcing actions on all actors within the value chain, as well as stakeholders within the
extended enterprise. By attempting to identify the system elements, relationships, goal,
inputs, controls, and outputs, we model the system in order to help us gain insight into the
most significant cause and effect relationships driving the behavior of the system.
Twenty-one factor inputs across the Strategic, Operational, Financial, and Risk
dimensions comprise the relevant characteristics used to evaluate specific sourcing
alternatives. An aggregate function across these four dimensions helps us to compare two
sourcing alternatives, using a metric of 'overall value to the extended enterprise.'
By applying the model to two case examples-the 737 vertical fin and the 777
vertical fin-we test the proposed model's validity and usability and find it to be
satisfactory for the expressed purposes of improved standardization, explicit
communication/documentation, and flexible/scalable structure. However, a significant
limitation remains inherent in the proposed model due to its methodology of subjective
weighting and scoring assessments. Such qualitative assessments are vulnerable to
individual or collective bias. Nonetheless, this model should be viewed as a start point,
and a basis for further improvement.
Based on interviews and observations of strategic sourcing meetings from June-
December 2007 with Boeing Commercial Airplanes, a very well-designed high-level
gated process structure is in place at the company.
Finding: Cross-functional strategic sourcing decision teams
Recommendation: Sustain the current high-level organizational framework and expand to
include external and internal customers, as well as other potentially valuable contributors
to the strategic sourcing dialog.
Finding: Emphasis on "enterprise partner" long-term sourcing vision
Recommendation: Sustain to further strengthen relationships and build trust. In light of
the challenges related to the 787, be aware of potential tendencies for the company to
regress toward a more adversarial mode of interacting with suppliers.
Finding: Strong motivation to improve strategic sourcing practices
Recommendation: Sustain and recognize current challenges as opportunities to learn and
improve strategic sourcing processes. There are outstanding people working very hard to
help the company advance its strategic sourcing process.
6.1. Opportunities for Improvement
In the past, the view of strategic sourcing within pockets of the BCA organization
appears to have been constrained by the notion that sourcing strategy should be about
minimizing cost for some minimum required service level. By changing the
organizational perspective to recognize global sourcing as an opportunity to create and
deliver maximum value for the customer, this new approach can enable Boeing to
effectively address the challenges it will face in the future. Leaders at all levels should
recognize strategic sourcing as an opportunity to reinforce Boeing's competitive position
as it copes with the threat of new entrants and strong forces of vertical disintegration
inherent to a mature industry.
The supply chain must evolve along with the market, as products in different
stages of their lifecycle have different needs. As the industry clockspeed accelerates, the
ability to quickly adapt the supply chain becomes more valuable. Boeing can achieve its
vision of a supply chain which harnesses the forces of globalization and new market
possibilities to add to the enterprise competitive advantage.
At the tactical level, a number of opportunities exist for BCA to improve. In
particular, alignment of individual sourcing decisions with the overarching strategy and
development of a more standardized, unambiguous approach toward factor analysis and
integration will help improve organizational learning, and consequently the quality of
strategic sourcing decisions.
Finding: Non-standard analysis at the detail level. Complex sourcing analysis
processes, multi-discipline involvement, and a changing workforce makes consistent
application of standard processes a significant challenge. Since historical documentation
presents explicit analysis of only some of the important factors relevant to sourcing
decisions, it is unclear whether undocumented factors were considered, and if so how
they were assessed and integrated into the decision process.
Recommendation: Facilitate more process standardization through training and
organizational discipline. Through a more consistent approach and a standardized
feedback process, an opportunity exists for BCA to continuously improve the quality of
its strategic sourcing decisions.
Finding: Emphasis on short-term financial metrics, such as: traditional accounting-
based cost reduction, fixed asset reduction, and sales emphasis to increase revenue
Recommendation: Emphasize long-term "enterprise maximum value" metrics, which
explicitly incorporate strategic and operational value assessments with financial value.
Finding: "Ad hoc" risk analyses
Recommendation: Conduct deliberate risk modeling for strategic sourcing with due
diligence, consultation with customers, and defined knowledge management strategy in
accordance with evolving core competencies.
Finding: Non-value added accounting complexity in the form of a 15-pg accounting
NPV analysis spreadsheet (including overhead allocation) to support decision-making
Recommendation: Substitute managerial accounting metrics which consider only unique
costs and "contribution" of a product to the joint costs of the enterprise.
Finding: Reactive offset-related work placement decisions "after the fact"
Recommendation: Analyze (by product) all BCA current state sourcing methods and how
each aligns with the future state business strategy; evaluate future possibilities for
"proactive" work placement.
Finding: Organizational resistance, sensitivity, and lack of transparency; may be in
part due to different strategic perspectives and time horizons, and ongoing 787 sourcing
challenges (Global Partners), as well as emotional attachment to complex cost estimation
tools and traditional accounting techniques (Finance)
Recommendation: Leadership support, including one high-level process leader
responsible for enterprise-wide alignment and management; empower multiple leaders at
different levels and across silos to share information and develop effective strategies and
tactics for sourcing.
Finding: Lack of systematic feedback process for strategic sourcing; sourcing
practitioners are focused on near-term deliverables such that specific time for systematic
reflection and process improvement is lacking
Recommendation: Implement continuous improvement feedback through annual review
examining the effects of past 1 to 10-year strategic sourcing actions.
6.2. Areas for Further Study
While completing this work, I came to appreciate the difficulty and complexity of
the task at hand. In this thesis I have emphasized a holistic approach to strategic sourcing
analysis and unambiguous communication and documentation of the reasons why
strategic sourcing decisions are made in order to allow the organization to learn. From
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this point, improved factor integration and refinement of the decision support tool, as
well as possible development of a systems dynamics model, are recommended areas to
focus efforts for deeper insight into the benefits, costs, and risks of global sourcing
alternatives.
Refinement of the decision-support tool. Weighted average approaches like the one
presented in this thesis come with significant limitations. As described by Doug Hubbard,
a decision analysis consultant and author, such approaches are unlikely to improve
decisions for a number of reasons, such as (Gilmore, 2004):
* the fundamental concept is flawed if the weightings aren't factually based;91
* conflicts of interest may arise when people completing the scoring have biases
and vested interests in the outcome;
* people frequently override the answer the method gives to get the answer they
want;
* people really don't trust the answers they get; and
* it often doesn't include real decision criteria92
Recognizing these limitations, the intent of this work has been to view the model as an
iterative step improvement from the current process upon which to base further
improvement efforts.
Systems Dynamics Modeling. System-level simulation can be a valuable tool for
representing and measuring time-based performance of a real-world stochastic production
and business system. In a systems dynamics model, a few vital inputs should be chosen
from the entire system of controllable and noise variables 93 , and the focus of
improvement should be on controlling these inputs. Although not a "crystal ball" through
91 Ratings (say a scale of 1-5 for each category) often don't really reflect the true differences in sourcing
alternatives. Is a vendor that receives a 4 really twice as good in that category as one which gets a 2?92 Decision-makers often choose vendors because they just feel more comfortable with them or their team.
But you never see this as one of the categories in a weighted average, along with many others. Risk, a very
important factor, is often not included explicitly.
93 Note: Noise factors are factors that cannot be controlled or can be controlled at an unaffordable cost,
such as randomness and variability factors.
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which to predict and optimize system behavior, as a tool and an experimental platform
such models can lead to valuable system information that benefits planning, design, and
optimization, particularly when combined with appropriate statistical analyses,
experimental design, and efficient search engine.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
General Perceptions of Strategic Sourcing
1. What are your general perceptions of company sourcing practices? (related to
insourcing, outsourcing, and offshoring)
2. What elements are important to consider when thinking about supply chain costs
and risks?
3. What does BCA's existing supply chain look like? (i.e. What is sourced where?)
Work Transfer Decision-making
4. Please describe Boeing's standard process for work transfer decision-making.
5. What metrics are appropriate to understand the benefits, costs and risks of
potential work transfers?
6. What costs have been overestimated or underestimated in the past? Why?
7. Has Boeing had any disappointments or shocks related to suppliers? Why?
8. How does Boeing estimate opportunity costs for strategic sourcing?
9. How available and to what level of accuracy confidence is Boeing's / supplier
cost data?
10. Does Boeing currently use software packages to estimate total costs and/or risks
associated with outsourcing?
11. What is Boeing's standard future cost savings threshold to justify changing
suppliers? (e.g. simple percentage-must save > 40% to cover all hidden costs)
Integrated Cost Model
12. How would you envision a total, integrated supply chain cost / risk model?
13. What types of inputs and outputs should the model have?
14. Who, when, and how do you think such a model would be used for decision-
making?
15. In creating a framework / model, what user should it be designed for? (Quick
high-level analysis or detailed in-depth analysis?)
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APPENDIX D: DETAILED COST LIST
I. Price /Production Cost per Unit. Sum of all direct material and labor costs divided by
the number of units.
o Material cost
o Direct hourly labor rate
* Wage growth rate
* Labor productivity
* Learning curve
* Cost of Management
* Transportation & Logistics
* Cost of Procurement / Overhead
II. Transportation / Logistics Cost.
o Dealing with inferior infrastructure
o Transportation
o Receiving (including moving heavier packaging for shipment protection)
o Inspection.
o Holding inventory (heating costs, warehouse maintenance, etc.)
o Insurance
o Capital charge for keeping inventory
III. Investment Cost (Capability / Capacity Development).
o Supplier Selection & Negotiation
* Search for and visit supplier
* Negotiation with supplier
o Transition Support Team (GP, Eng, Tooling, Manuf)
* Gather information and codify knowledge of the process transferred
* Package the process for IP protection
* Modify and pilot the process outsourced and re-sourced (incl
modification due to different climate)
* Supplier initial training and technical support
* Qualify new supplier
* Qualify new sub-tier supplier
* Procurement Quality Assurance audit
* Per diem (Including travel and lodging)
* other GP assistance
* other Engineering assistance
* other Tooling assistance
* other Manufacturing assistance
o Tooling Cost
* Tool design / redesign
* New equipment
* New tools (incl. rate tooling)
* Initial rework
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* Breakdown
* Setup
o Manufacturing Cost
* Engineering design / redesign
* New equipment
* Build ahead premium
* NC programming
* Planning and inventory management
o Facilities / PP&E impact
* Buy or sale raw land (Property)
* Buy or sale building (Plant)
* Buy or sale equipment (Plant)
* Clear building
* Prepare building for sale or lease
* Demolish or modify building
* Site clean-up (Including environmental)
* Lease costs or early exit penalties
* Permits, commissions and other fees
* Transportation (Freight and Internal)
* Move equipment, tools or computers
* Build new cribs/kits (Boxes)
o Labor
* Local personnel recruit and training
* Restructure redundant capacity and labor
* People disruption
* Skill retention premiums
o IT / Computing Cost
* Systems conversion
* Buy computing equipment
* Install network
* Boeing owned applications to suppliers
* Setup data transmission security
* Add or Delete products or services (Including sub-contracting)
* Add supplier to internal IT system
* Invest in suppliers' IT systems (e.g. MRP, ERP, TCM, etc.)
IV. Supplier Management Cost.
o Impact of residiual supply from previous supplier
o Sustaining support pax working abroad
o Quality Assurance audits
o Local hires
o Supplier training and technical support
o Co-operation with supplier for innovation
o Update forecast and convey it to suppliers
o Performance review and meeting
o Renegotiation
o Costs of phone calls, faxes, video conferences
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V. Tax Impact.
o Tax and duty
o Tax credits
o Job training subsidy
o Other state/federal aid (cost mitigation)
o Discount term
o Benefit from payment terms changes
VI. ALifecycle Cost.
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APPENDIX E: INTEGRATED RISK FRAMEWORK
* Diversification
* Relationship-
specific Investment
* Poor RM quality
* Excessive handling
at border crossings
. Single-source
dependency
* "Bullwhip" effect
* Winner's Curse / Bid
too high
Labor Dispute (Climate)
Intellectual Property Breaches / Poaching
Knowledge Dependence
Supplier Upstream Vertical Integration
Deliberate Underperformance / Shirking
Opportunistic Renegotiation / Assertion
Moral Hazard
* IT Systems Breakdown
* Capacity dependence (high utilization rate)
* Poor supplier quality / misrep.
* Inadequate supplier capability / misrep.
* Supplier inflexibility
* Single-source dependency
* "Bullwhip" effect
* Inventory Holding Costs
* Logistics & Transportation Costs
" Labor rate inflation
" Long term operating costs
* Rework / scrap costs
* Supplier Bankruptcy
* # & Financial Strength of Customers
* OEM Supplier
Power
* Environmental
sustainability
* Safety
* Delivery lead time
* Inaccurate Demand
Forecast
* Obsolescence
* Fixed costs
* Operating costs
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0C.
0
a)
0
(U
S* Transportation Capacity
W_ * Natural Disasters (Geographic Concentration) * Transportation Pricing
* Acts of War * RM Availability
* Terrorism * RM Pricing
* Legislation / Regulation * Exchange rate fluctuation
oI * Financial Recession * Industry-wide capacity
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APPENDIX F: GLOSSARY
Effectiveness: a measure of a system's ability to meet the objectives of its stakeholders
Efficiency: a measure of a system's ability to achieve its objectives with the least amount
of waste or non-value-added effort
Global sourcing: strategic sourcing in a global setting often aimed to exploit global
efficiencies in the delivery of a product or service
Globalization: the growing economic interdependence of countries world-wide through
the increasing volume and variety of crossborder transactions in goods and services and
of international capital flows, and also through the more rapid and widespread diffusion
of technology (International Monetary Fund, 1997); international integration driven by a
combination of economic, technological, socio-cultural and political forces
Horizontal integration: style of managerial control in which a firm consolidates
holdings across multiple industries
Insourcing: delegation of operations or jobs from production within a business to an
internal entity that specializes in that operation; opposite of outsourcing
Offshoring: transfer of an organizational function to another country, regardless of
whether the work is outsourced or stays within the same corporation
Outsourcing: transfer of the management and/or day-to-day execution of an entire
business function to an external service provider, regulated by contractual agreement
Strategic sourcing: an institutional procurement process that continuously improves and
re-evaluates the purchasing activities of a company; one component of supply chain
management
Supply chain: system of organizations, people, technology, activities, information and
resources involved in transforming natural resources, raw materials and components into
a finished product delivered to the end customer; supply chains link value chains
Supply chain management (SCM): the process of planning, implementing, and
controlling the operations of the supply chain as efficiently as possible; spans all
movement and storage of raw materials, work-in-process inventory, and finished goods
from point-of-origin to point-of-consumption
Value chain: chain of ordered activities which products pass through and gain some
value as a direct result of each activity
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Vertical disintegration: breakdown of a production process into separate companies,
each performing a limited subset of activities required to create a finished product,
typically to share risk in volatile markets or resulting from various diseconomies of scale
or scope
Vertical integration: style of managerial control in which a firm owns its upstream
suppliers and its downstream buyers
Value stream: all activities, both value added and non-value added, required to bring a
product from raw material state into the hands of the customer, bring a customer
requirement from order to delivery, and bring a design from concept to launch
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